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ABSTRACT
The cleanup of hazardous waste sites presents both the biggest
challenges and biggest opportunities for the construction industry. It is our
next great engineering problem. Rather than stimulate, ten years of
Superfund have stymied innovation in remediation technologies. This thesis
analyzes the strengths and weakness of three key elements of the current
process--Superfund, the Department of Defense, and the Construction
Industry. The driving purpose in examining these elements is to synthesize
their strengths, weaknesses, and interests to find a model for the federal
government effectively promoting innovation.
The study found DOD's remediation program to share Superfund's
problems of inconsistency, defining risk, and risk assessment. DOD,
through the Army Corps of Engineers, does however have a history of
successfully sponsoring R&D, contracting, and managing large construction
problems, in addition to owning numerous sites of varying toxic complexity.
Using Michael Porter's models for analyzing both the construction industry
and the remediation market, problems in bonding, insurance, and financing
combine with uncertain liability issues to keep new entrants and established
firms from risking breakthrough technologies.
In addition to recommendations for internal improvements to the
Defense Environmental Restoration Program, this study proposes DOD take
the lead among federal agencies (vice EPA and DOE) in promoting
innovation in remediation. Using their expertise to improve contracting and
ensure proprietary rights of innovators, DOD should pursue two separate
strategies for development--one taking the contracting and risk lessons from
our experience in high-tech weapons development/procurement, the other
investing in incremental development by creating a stable market, clearer
specifications, and competitive bidding to stimulate competitors.
Thesis Supervisor: Fred Moavenzadeh
Title: Director, Center for Construction Research and Education
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DEFINITIONS
BDA T: Best Demonstrated Available Technology. EPA approved
remediation techniques--minimum standard for site specific cleanup.
CERCLA: the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980, otherwise knows as Superfund. The initial
Federal legislation and funding ($1.6 billion) for determining the
location, scope, responsible parties, and cleanup of the nation's
hazardous waste sites.
DERA: the Defense Appropriation Act of 1984. Established a transfer
account which funds the Defense Environmental Restoration Program.
DERP: the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. The Department of
Defense hazardous waste cleanup program.
DOD: the United States Department of Defense
EPA: the Environmental Protection Agency.
GAO: the General Accounting Office of the federal government.
HODA: Headquarters, Department of the Army
IRP: the U.S. Army plan for complying with the Defense Environmental
Restoration Program. Outlines procedures for identification and
cleanup of Army hazardous waste sites.
NPL: the National Priorities List. List generated by Superfund legislation
ranking the nation's worst hazardous waste sites.
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTA: the Office of Technology Assessment of the federal government.
PA/SI: Preliminary Assessment and Site Inspection. Steps in the Army's
remediation program in compliance with Superfund legislation.
PRP: Potentially Responsible Parties. Under Superfund, individuals or
entities which may be held liable for cleanup of a hazardous waste
site.
RCRA: the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976. Legislative
guidelines for hazardous waste disposal--a precursor to Superfund.
RD/RA: Remedial Design/Remedial Action. Steps in the Army's remediation
program in compliance with Superfund legislation.
remediation: the act correcting or "healing," from the word remedy.
RI/FS: Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study. Steps in the Army's
remediation program in compliance with Superfund legislation.
ROD: Record of Decision. Legislatively directed step in the cleanup process
where the standard for cleanup is dictated and the remediation
technology to be used is specified.
RPM: Remedial Project Manager. Action officer for site cleanup in the
Army's remediation program.
SARA: the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986.
Legislation and funding ($9 billion) which continued Superfund for
cleanup of non-Federal sites.
Superfund: commonly used name for the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980 and its
reauthorization in 1986, the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA).
USACE: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USA THAMA: U.S. Army Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency
1. INTRODUCTION
Cleanup of the toxins we have systematically dumped into the land,
sea, and air presents the federal government and the construction industry
with its greatest challenges and opportunities for the next century. Our first
attempt at fixing past sins, the Superfund, created an inefficient process
which, over the past ten years, has both deterred industry from finding
new, innovative technologies and failed to clean-up the mess. No other
federal agency has responsibility for remediation of more sites that the
Department of Defense. Likewise, no federal agency has a history of
contracting, research and development, solving "mega-problems," and
managing mega-projects as the Department of Defense. My challenge in
this thesis is in applying these historic strengths of DOD to first cleaning-up
its own mess, and more importantly, taking the lead in government in
sponsoring innovation in the construction industry to find better remediation
technologies.
The strategy this thesis pursues follows a simple, time-honored
process: identify the problems; analyze the components of the identified
problem in terms of what we know, what we don't know and want to
discover, what are the strengths and weaknesses of the players and
programs, and lastly; synthesize and make concrete recommendations that
may solve the problem.
This paper defines the problem in terms of three key elements, the
Superfund, the Department of Defense and its military waste, and the
current and potential Construction and Cleanup Industry. The study then
analyzes the remediation action arm of DOD (the Corps of Engineers), the
Defense Environmental Restoration Program and its ties to Superfund, and a
thorough market analysis of the growing remediation sector of the
construction industry and the inhibitors to innovation. In synthesizing the
above analysis--packaging the identified strengths, weaknesses, and market
forces to produce mutual gains for the three elements--two models for DOD
emerge.
The recommendations proposed take two forms. First,
recommendations particular to the Defense Environmental Restoration
Program are put forward. More importantly, the paper recommends
changes in contracting, standard setting, and proprietary protection. A
high-tech model based upon lessons learned through weapons-systems
procurement and a second, traditional low-tech model seeking incremental
innovation, synthesize and implement the given recommendations.
2. PROBLEM
Are we getting what we pay for? Superfund comes up for its second
reauthorization soon and may be in trouble based on its past performance.
Enacted in 1980, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) had a simple mandate: "find the
mess, find who did it, make them clean it up." Ten years and close to $10
billion later, only a handful of sites on the National Priority List have been
completely cleaned. Worse yet, no one has yet to technically solve the
problem of how to permanently "clean up the mess."
While there are numerous players in this process, this chapter will
introduce and develop only three. The first and most important is
Superfund. What is it? What's good about it? What's bad about it? For
the purposes of this study, we will refer to Superfund the legislation; the
federal policy; the law--not the pot of money to be spent on clean ups
(although it is that also). Another player is the environmental services and
construction industry on which the burden of physically cleaning-up the
mess falls. The third, the Department of Defense, has been one of the
worst polluters, yet, through the Corps of Engineers, could be a catalyst
driving the other two players to both find innovative technological solutions
and to actually clean up.
2.1 Superfund
Federal environmental legislation in the United States finds its roots in
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), passed in 1976.
While RCRA did legislate guidelines for hazardous waste disposal, it did not
require cleanup of past disposal sites. The first Federal legislation requiring
cleanup of past hazardous waste disposal sites was the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980-
-now known as Superfund. 1 The Superfund was a $1.6 billion trust fund
covering a five-year program. It would finance the investigation of dump
sites and identify those responsible for the cleanups. The program would
finance site remediation if it failed to identify the responsible parties. 2
CERCLA was implemented by Federal regulations in December 1982 with
the expansion of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan (NCP) to include response actions for hazardous
substance release into the environment.
In 1984, Congress amended RCRA. Section 3004 of the amendment
required cleanup of past disposal sited located at facilities for which a RCRA
Part B permit is required. Since RCRA is administered by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the states, procedures and
jurisdictions differed from CERCLA. In 1986, the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act (SARA) continued the Superfund for the cleanup of
non-Federal sites and resolved many of the distinctions between RCRA and
CERCLA 3 and accelerated the cleanup of the hazardous waste sites. It set
1 U.S. Army Installation Restoration Program Guidance and Procedure, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency (Washington D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1990), pp. 1-2 thru 1-3.
2 Robert H. Harris and Grover C. Wrenn, "Making Superfund Work," Issues in Science and
Technology (Washington D.C.: National Academy of Science, Spring 1988), p. 54.
3 U.S. Army Installation Restoration Program Guidance and Procedure, pp. 1-2 thru 1-3.
aside $9 billion for a five-year effort, including $98 million targeted for
studies on detecting and evaluating waste hazards and $100 million for
research, demonstration, and training programs on new cleanup
technologies.4
2.1.1 What's Wrong with Superfund?
Detailing the frailties of CERCLA and SARA from both scientific and
policy perspectives have kept academians and political scientists arguing,
speaking, publishing, and employed since 1981. From an empirical
perspective, Superfund has disappointed on three particular points: overly-
ambitious original goals, limited results, and little value for our money.
Superfund was Congress' response to a public that, in effect,
demanded: "Find every hazardous waste site, get rid of every speck of
contamination, bill the polluters, and don't make any mistakes."
Unfortunately, Congress, the EPA, and the public all underestimated the
scope of the problem on three counts--the number of sites, the cost and
difficulty of cleaning-up, and the cost and difficulty of bringing those
responsible to court. "Now we know that the task of cleaning uncontrolled
hazardous waste sites will be with us well into the 21st century," says
Thomas Grumbly, president of Clean Sites (a "Superfund facilitation" group
in Washington D.C., with members from industry, EPA, universities and
environmental groups). Clean Sites estimates that it will cost at least $30
billion to clean the remaining sites on the national priority list. The Office of
4 Harris and Wrenn, p. 55.
Technology Assessment estimates the total cleanup bill of all U.S.
hazardous waste sites to be $500 billion.5
Pragmatically, the best yardstick of any policy or program is the net
result of the legislation--the bottom line. To date, there have been too few
cleanups. With EPA spending roughly $7.5 billion since 1981, only 64 of
the 1200 currently listed sites have been completed. 6 Additionally, there
remains an additional 29,000 lower priority sites relegated to the states for
cleanup.7 Admittedly, many more sites than the 64 are in some stage of
investigation or remediation because of Superfund and the next ten years
will most likely see more completed cleanups than the past ten. Still, to its
sharpest critics, the Superfund just has not cleaned-up the mess.
A third detractor from the program has been the lack of value
delivered to the customer. One facet of the program's inefficiency and
failure to deliver is outlined above. A more incriminating indictment has
been the excessive price the government pays for services. The Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) reports that it is not uncommon for the
government to spend from 100%-500% more than a private client for the
same site study or cleanup. Their report sites as an example a contractor
performing a feasibility study and recommending his own proprietary
treatment process--at a cost of $1.3 million more than alternative
treatments. The report followed a General Accounting Office (GAO) report
to the same effect. EPA acknowledges that money is being wasted. John
Martin, EPA's Inspector General, admits, "Superfund is particularly sensitive
5 Dan Morse, "What's Wrong With Superfund?" Civil Engineering (New York, New York:
American Society of Civil Engineers, Vol. 59, No. 4, April 1989), p. 40.
6
"Nearly A Third Of Superfund Went To Administrative Costs Since 1988," The Boston
Globe, 19 June 1991, p. 10.
7 Morse, p. 40.
to fraud, waste and abuse." 8 A June 1991 Boston Globe article charged
that $62 million--nearly one-third of the $200 million spent since 1988 to
clean up the nation's worst sites--have been paid to some of the nation's
largest engineering firms for administrative services. It continued, "The
payments go far beyond the terms of most government contracts, which
pay only for the actual time and expenses needed to administer their
projects." 9 Such gold-plating is nothing new in the Federal government--the
Department of Defense immediately comes to mind. However, when
combined with such ambitious goals and costly, yet conspicuously absent
results, the gouging rightly inflames the bill-payers.
This paper will raise and analyze Superfund's and the Defense
Environmental Restoration Program's (DERPs) other less obvious, yet
important, weaknesses in later sections.
8 lbid., p. 43.
9
"Nearly A Third Of Superfund Went To Administrative Costs Since 1988," p. 10.
2.1.2 What's Right with Superfund?
What I believe has happened in the last ten years that made the
Superfund program a success from the public policy standpoint is that
people have begun to see the real economic impact associated with
remediation of hazardous waste problems and, as a result, the
importance of prevention. In my opinion the Superfund has done
more as a regulatory preventative program than most people realize,
and that may indeed be one of it's greatest contributions to the
solution of the hazardous waste problem. The statute has changed
the behavior of almost every sector of our society by virtue of it
making apparent the significant costs associated with remediation of
hazardous waste problems. In economic terms the Superfund
Program has internalized the externalities to the point where it has
become a major factor in preventing a proliferation of future
hazardous waste sites. 10
Ira Leighton, EPA
Industry well realizes the impact of Superfund on the market. The
greening of corporate America and to a great extend the Federal
government can be directly traced to the stick created by CERCLA. The
coincidental fallout created by Superfund's inefficiencies--exorbitant
remedial costs and years of costly litigation--have raised the cost of doing
business for just about every sector of productive society. Mr. Leighton
succinctly captures the pervasive impact of the legislation. In the market
model of our society, pollution and hazardous waste have long been
considered externalities--legal by-products of the market's production.
Industry is now culpable for not only the pollution they currently generate,
but the waste they legally dumped years past. The cost to industry is
substantial and minimizing those costs has caused the market to internalize
the externality. Already, environmental compliance costs for many Fortune
1 0 1ra Leighton, Chief, Connecticut Waste Management Branch, EPA Region I, "Interview,"
Construction (Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Center for Construction Research and
Education, Spring 1991), p. 14.
500 companies are 30%-40% of annual earnings, according to Tucker
Anthony studies. 1 1 As later sections in this paper will show, retro-fitting
industry to minimize current waste and cleaning-up old waste is big business
and has sprung from obscurity to a booming, multi-billion dollar industry
since 1980.
Would any other form of policy/legislation have so drastically changed
corporate society or the market in so little time? There are as many
different opinions and recommendations on this question as there are dollars
set aside for Superfund. Without a doubt, the side effect is good--it points
toward our maturing as a society. The aim of this thesis is not to rewrite
Superfund, but to assess, adapt, and overcome some of its gross
inefficiencies.
2.2 Military Waste
Shielded by the mantle of "national security," the armed forces
and military contractors have either been exempt from environmental
regulations or ignored them... Military toxins are contaminating water
used for drinking or irrigation, killing fish, befouling the air, and
rendering vast tracts of land unusable for generations to come.
Having been dumping grounds for a lethal soup of hazardous
materials for decades, military bases have become health time bombs
detonating in slow motion. 12
State of the World 1991
While the above writer's perception and condemnation was in many
ways true, it no longer accurately reflects either the environmental policy or
recent performance of our military. A nation's military is a reflection of the
nation and society from which it draws, and carries with it the norms and
11Ken Sternberg, "Cleaning Up," Chemicalweek, 11 October 1989, p. 21.
12Michael Renner, "Assessing the Military's War on the Environment," State of the World
1991 (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1991), pp.133,141.
ethics of that society. Like corporate America, there has been a gradual
greening of the military for the past decade and an intensive focusing of
both manpower and resources in the past two years to cleanup old waste
and minimize production of new waste. The Chief of Engineers recently
forwarded this guidance.
As a commander, you are entrusted with the stewardship of
the land, air, water and natural and cultural resources associated with
performing your military mission. These resources must be carefully
managed to serve both the Army's, and the nation's, short and long-
term needs. Today, environmental considerations must be a part of
your decisions...I cannot overstate the importance of your
environmental stewardship." 13
LTG Henry Hatch
2.2.1 How much Military Waste, old and new, is there?
The use of hazardous materials is fundamental to the readiness
mission of the Army, arising from such areas as, but not limited to,
weapon development and testing, training, equipment repair, and
machinery maintenance. As a result, the Army is a large user of
hazardous materials and large generator of hazardous waste
(approximately 100,000 metric tons annually). Management of such
materials is becoming more complex and time consuming due to
recent environmental legislation. 14
HODA 5-year Plan, Sep 90
The above excerpt seems to state the obvious--that hazardous materials
and thus hazardous wastes are an unfortunate part of the business of
defense, and that figuring-out what to do with that material is no easy task.
13Lieutenant General Henry J. Hatch, "Forward: Environmental Stewardship," in
Commander's Guide to Environmental Management, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Toxic
and Hazardous Materials Agency (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, October
1990).
14 Five Year Integrated Hazardous Material/Hazardous Waste Management Plan: DRAFT,
U.S. Army Construction Engineering Research Laboratory (Champaign, Illinois, September,
1990), p. 3.
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Figure 2.1 shows DOD's best estimate of past hazardous waste production
for the years 1985 to 1987. The table is taken from a 1989 GAO study on
DOD's hazardous waste situation. A year later, the Chief of Engineers
followed-up with his Five-Year Integrated Hazardous Material/Hazardous
Waste Management Plan, 15 acknowledging "the many useful efforts
ongoing within the Army, but recognize(ing) the need for some institutional
changes within the Army." The sheer size and scope of the problem is
causing the Army to come to grips with the new standards and, in many
cases, begin the shift from "reaction" to "proaction."
The Department of Defense owns approximately 100,000 square
kilometers in the United States and leases about 80,000 square kilometers
from other federal agencies. This represents almost 2 percent of the
territory in the United States 1 6--roughly the size of the state of Nebraska.
Over the years, the sources of pollution on these installations have ranged
from fuel spills during maneuvers to lead, high explosives, and other toxins
from tank and artillery gunnery ranges which remain in the ground. 17
Finding effective solutions to the problem of existing wastes will require a
flexible framework that can adjust to and hopefully anticipate the changing
polis. 18
1 5 1bid, p. 2.
1 6 Renner, p. 134.
1 7 1bid., p. 135.
1 8 From Deborah A. Stone, Policy Paradox and Political Reason (Glenview, Illinois: Scott,
Foresman and Company, 1988): As opposed to the traditional market model, where public
interest and policy are shaped by market forces, Stone describes and advocates an alternate
model called the polis--a political community where public norms, values, and interests
shape policy rather than market forces.
20
Services' Hazardous Waste Generation Data 19
1985 1986 1987
Tons Tons Tons
COMMAND Generated Generated Generated
Air Force a
Systems Command 197.35 446.43 1,149.6
Air Training Command 605.00 660.47 869.60
Military Airlift Command 3,426.37 3,086.36 3,480.80
Strategic Air Command 1,789.94 2,374.09 2,759.00
Tactical Air Command 1,779.16 577.14 3,101.50
Logistics Command 51,875.54 87,882.98 1,134,071.60
Other Commands 812.16 958.83 1,208.70
Total 60,485.52 95,986.30 1,146,640.80
Army
Forces Command 812.03 2,764.06 7,478.38
Training Command 2,882.59 2,340.90 1,287.97
Army Material Command 103,770.54 133,502.20 56,645.10
Other Commands 59.05 190.34 542.26
Total 107,524.21 138,797.50 65,953.71
Navy
Space and Warfare b 72.95 44.75
Systems
Naval Supply Command 332.80 2,307.18 1,068.16
Pacific Fleet 8,182.69 12,439.31 105,674.89
Air Systems Command 37,382.68 30,165.33 6,013.75
Sea Systems Command 50,834.64 56,404.00 51,627.20
Facilities Engineering 90,553.95 63,135.00 640.34
Other Commands 84,088.07 18,742.84 10,155.53
Total 271,374.83 183,266.61 175,224.62
Note: Inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the reported generation data is discussed
thoroughly in the GAO report.
aData furnished by the Air Force for 1987 reflects gross generations, which includes
reclaimed, recycled,and reused chemicals and wastewater that is subsequently treated and
removed prior to disposal.
bThe Space and Warfare Systems Command was not established until 1986.
Source: GAO Figure 2.1
19 Hazardous Waste: DOD Efforts to Reduce Waste (Washington D.C.: United States
General Accounting Office, February 1989), p. 30.
2.2.2 The Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP).
The Army established the Installation Restoration Program (IRP) in 1975
in response to regulatory action at several installations where they had
contaminated local streams and groundwater. Later, President Carter
required that Federal activities comply with the requirements of Federal
environmental legislation when he issued Executive Order 12088, "Federal
Compliance with Pollution Control Standards." Congress followed with
CERCLA in 1980 and the NCP in December 1982.
The Defense Appropriation Act of 1984 established a transfer
account, the Defense Environmental Restoration Account (DERA), that funds
the IRP for active installations in the continental United States, removal of
unsafe structures or debris, and properties formerly owned or used by DOD
(FUDs). Congress also amended RCRA in 1984. Most Army installations
were affected by Section 3004 requiring cleanup of past disposal sites
located at facilities for which a RCRA Part B permit is required.
In 1986, SARA mandated several changes for the Department of
Defense. Most importantly, it established the Defense Environmental
Restoration Program (DERP) which has as its primary goal "the
identification, investigation, research and development, and cleanup of
contamination from hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants."
It continued DERA as the funding source for IRP and other DERP activities
and added a new Section 120 to CERCLA relating to Federal facilities.
Section 120 requires that all Federal facilities "shall be subject to, and
comply with, this act in the same manner and to the same extent, both
procedurally and substantively, as any non-government entity." This does
not mean that DERA is equal to Superfund, in fact there are a few key
differences. DERP and Army IRP activities apply to all Army sites which
22
pose a threat to public health, welfare, or the environment. Superfund
concerns only the "worst" hazardous waste sites in the nation--those on the
National Priorities List (NPL). While several Army installations are on the
NPL, no Army IRP activity receives Superfund funding. In fact, DOD
reimburses EPA for costs incurred during investigations. Unity of
responsibility (in terms of PRPs) avoids some of the administrative intricacies
of Superfund. IRP activities are, however, subjected to administrative
requirements which do not apply to Superfund sites--schedule requirements,
interagency agreements, Annual Reports to Congress, and Technical Review
Committees to name a few.20
The Department of Defense identified 17,482 sites that may have
been contaminated on 1,855 installations in its FY90 report to Congress
submitted in February 1991. Of these, the Environmental Protection
Agency has placed 95 on its list of hazardous waste sites and 89 on the
NPL. DOD requested $1.25 billion in its FY92 budget for hazardous waste
sites on currently operating and former bases. Additionally, they seek
another $175 million for environmental restoration as part of the base-
closure program. According to DOD's Office of the Inspector General, the
total Cleanup cost could reach $200 billion. 2 1
2.2.3 The Corps of Engineers
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers are the nation's engineers. Since
1802, their non-wartime mission has been to manage the country's largest
engineering problems and undertakings--exploration west of the Mississippi,
2 0 U.S. Army Installation Restoration Program Guidance and Procedure, pp. 1-2 thru 1-4.
21 "Pentagon Update--Base Closures and Cleanup," The Military Engineer (Alexandria,
Virginia: The Society of American Military Engineers, July 1991), p. 21.
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the Panama Canal, the Manhattan Project, and the lock and dam system
necessary throughout the country to manage coastal and river waterways.
Currently, the Corps can be justifiably considered the largest construction
management organization in the world because of both its size and the
scope of its ongoing projects.
Soon after assuming duties as the Chief of Engineers, LTG Henry
Hatch charted the future strategy for the force in his 1989 directive, Our
Vision. New and foremost in this policy was his pledge:
We will assist the Army and DOD in meeting their total
environmental responsibilities, including restoring the
environmental quality of military installations. We must also
focus the full force of our expertise in addressing the Nation's
problems of: toxic and hazardous waste clean-up; disposal and
maintenance of nuclear wastes; protection of water resources;
and, disposal of dredge and fill material. 22
As shown earlier, the Chief of Engineers draws his cue from a history
of Federal legislation and the Corps' traditional involvement with the
environment (some famous and some infamous)--in particular with wetlands
and waterways.
2.3. The Construction and Cleanup Industries
The simple fact that no one has figured-out, technologically, how to
clean up the mess, captures the situation for the remediation industry:
opportunity tempered by liability. The number of sites needing remediation,
the number of factories and production systems requiring refit, and the
Federal and private dollars available point to tremendous opportunity for
2 2 Lieutenant General Henry J. Hatch, Our Vision, Office of the Chief of Engineers
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 3.
engineers. Likewise, the lack of a clear standard for cleanup, exploding
litigation costs, the gauntlet of regulations and codes from various Federal
and state sources, and the required mountain of documentation required by
the system inhibits both technological innovation and new entrants to the
market. For the firms that do successfully discover how to clean up the
mess, the rewards could be substantial. For those who miss the brass ring,
the uncertainty associated with future liability will be costly.
2.3.1 Opportunity
The future of the industry is driven by two major forces--continued
polluting and ever-tightening regulations. The long-term growth of the
environmental service companies seems insured by the tremendous buildup
of toxic air emissions, hazardous materials, and waste sites by every sector
of industry. The unfortunate cost to society of modernization and progress
is waste. It seems guaranteed that if society moves forward in a
productivity sense, the market for dealing effectively with the by-products
of progress is assured. Additionally, as people, and thus politicians and
regulatory agencies, grow more concerned about environmental risks, the
percentage of gross national product industrialized nations spend for
cleanups will rise significantly higher than the 1%-2% they now spend. 23
Figure 2.2 illustrates the market in terms of current and potential dollars by
environmental service.
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2 3 Sternberg, pp. 21-22.
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The increasingly stringent set of laws and regulations which dictate
how cleanup companies treat these toxic waste sites only point toward
more work for those firms who learn to navigate the growing ocean of sites.
The DOD sites mentioned earlier are only a fraction of the opportunity.
Figure 2.3 shows in a different way, the opportunities in the remediation
arena for the foreseeable future. Of the 6,000 solid waste landfills in the
U.S., over half will need some remediation to meet revised federal standards
according to some estimates. Additionally, in August 1989, Energy
Secretary James Watkins launched a $19.5-billion five-year plan to clean up
the numerous weapons plants and their related facilities. 24
Hazardous Money 2 5
Source: Civil Engineering, Apr 89.
Figure 2.3
2 4 Conrad B. Mackerron, "Regulatory Muscle Drives the Market," Chemicalweek, 11 October
1989, p.23.
2 5 Morse, p.42.
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Program Cleanup Costs Est. number
(billions) of Sites
Superfund $50 2,000
Correcting $100 3,570
RCRA facilities
DOD $10-$15 6,000
DOE $53-$92 45
State and real $100 30,000
estate funded
Superfund is not the only enormous hazardous waste
cleanup program. (Sources for this chart are OTA, DOD,
DOE and Marcia Williams of Browning Ferris.)
2.3.2 Caution
No matter who pays for cleanups--EPA or the responsible
parties--Superfund will remain a constricting environment for the civil
engineer who wants to stretch out his or her arms and design a
cleanup. 26
Civil Engineering, April '89
The above indictment captures the misgivings of both entrants into
the remediation market and its current players. Their complaint rests on
two main points: concerns over liability and the inhibiting mountain of
documentation.
Superfund was a rare piece of legislation from the outset. It held
parties who broke no law in the past liable for cleaning-up their waste sites
to a new, undefined standard. An engineer working under a contract to
cleanup a waste site today rightly fears being held liable to some new,
harder standard ten years from now. Risk assessment is the linchpin of the
program, yet conceptually is fraught with inconsistency. Is one part per
million safe? Which contaminants in the site are hazardous, and to what
degree? Remediators are shooting at a moving target. A hit today may be
judged a miss tomorrow--and they'll have to pay. Contracting is based upon
who pays not to bear risk. There's a lot of money out there but the margins
quickly shrink when lawyers get involved.
28
261bid., p. 40.
The above confusion naturally leads to a cover-your-tail with paper
mindset in the industry.
Engineers designing cleanups for EPA must constantly be
aware that design plans will become courtroom evidence during cost
recovery proceedings...Instead of using pencils and computers,
engineers performing Superfund design spend their time reviewing
existing design documentation...the idea of making field decisions,
which would be useful in considering that no two hazardous waste
sites are the same, is dismissed because field decisions do not lend
themselves to detailed documentation.27
The gun-shy environment described understandably stymies
innovation. Engineers are forced to take the safest course, opting not for
the best solutions, but for the most defensible. In a multi-billion dollar
industry where "the answer" has yet to be found, some one or some
catalyst must step forward and seize the moment.
2 7 1bid., pp. 41-42.
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3. DISCUSSION
Given the presented criticisms of Superfund, the challenge ahead
remains to clean-up the mess. This portion of the study will analyze both
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as the action arm for the Department of
Defense, and the Environmental Services/Hazardous Waste remediation
Industry in terms of strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities.
The Corps of Engineers has both a historic and present role in
meeting the engineering needs of the country. In its role as the
government's engineering firm, it can play an even more significant role in
redressing our environmental mistakes. The Corps has assumed the lead in
the Department of Defense in both hazardous waste minimization and
remediation. This paper will study the Army's Installation Restoration
Program in terms of strengths and weaknesses.
Harvard business professor and author Michael Porter provides a
useful and insightful method of market analysis in his two books,
Competitive Strategy and Competitive Advantage. This section will use
those tools to distill and describe the current remediation and minimization
industries, discuss the risks for players in the market, and highlight
competitive opportunities.
Finally, this thesis will discuss two distinct strategies for the U.S.
government to create a more attractive market for firms to innovate and a
case for quickening the current process.
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3.1 Mandate of the Corps of Engineers
"Essayons" -- we will try.
3.1.1 Historic Role
The Corps has been and remains unique in the Department of Defense
because of its civil works mission. Historically, this mission has provided
the Corps a tradition of effective work with other Federal agencies, state
governments, and most importantly, the construction industry. Few
government agencies can match the involvement or working relationship of
the Corps with their counterparts in industry. Through its supervision of the
contracting, management, and construction of the nation's dams and locks,
defense infrastructure, and overseas bases, the Corps has developed a hard-
earned expertise in value engineering.
Like all agencies or even private firms, the Corps has "learned from
experience" (aka: made mistakes) in executing its missions. Because of its
breath of work, the Corps may have more organizational lessons-learned
than even the largest construction corporations. However, its size and
institutional knowledge quite naturally resist rapid change, particularly in
terms of process and procedure.
3.1.2 Current Role
Again, the Corps current role has changed little from its historical
one. They remain the primary construction organization for the U.S. Army,
the Department of Defense, and the Federal government. Their major
specified missions include:
* Manage and execute engineering, construction and real estate
programs for the Army and Air Force.
* Perform research and development in support of above programs.
* Provide specialized engineer and technical support to:
* Facility Engineers,
* Staff Engineers,
* Unit Commanders of Army engineer organizations.
* Provide specialized assistance to theater commanders in base
development planning for contingency operations.
* Manage and execute Civil Works Programs.
* Perform R&D in systems, specialized equipment, procedures and
techniques relevant to engineer support of combat operations. 28
As shown, the Corps remains deeply committed and involved in both
military (combat) engineering and civil works. On the civil side, USACE has
evolved from developing, designing, and constructing most of its work in-
house, to an organization which primarily plays a management role. Today,
about 85 percent of their design work and virtually all of their construction
is executed through contracts with civilian designers and builders. 29
While the Army receives only thirteen percent of the Defense RDT&E
budget, it accounts for more than half of all of the military's construction
R&D. This phenomenon can be partially explained by three factors. First,
the Army has the most people and therefore the majority of the facilities and
installations. Second, due to its ground combat role, the Army has the
2 8 Greg F. Martin, Construction: the Foundation of National Defense (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: a thesis submitted to the Department of Civil Engineering, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, April 1988), p. 84.
2 9 1bid., p. 85.
32
majority of the troop construction units. Finally, with the Corps of
Engineers and its historic involvement with construction and engineering
industry, the Army tends to assume the leadership role in this area. 30
Major General Patrick Kelly, Director of Civil Works for USACE,
recently wrote, "As the Corps moves into its third century, its challenges
are focused on natural resources management and protection while it
maintains an active construction mission." 3 1 In addition to DERP and other
previously introduced environmental legislation, the Water Resources
Development Acts of 1986, 1988, and 1990 increasingly expanded the
Corps' environmental program and authorities, with the last containing some
of the strongest environmental/wetlands protection language to date. 3 2 As
we can see, the Corps' involvement with the environment is multi-
dimensional. Its recent and on-going management of wetlands, combined
with its history of waterway infrastructure management, give it problem
solving experience and expertise beyond any other federal agency in
effectively bringing together the construction industry, environmental
services, the EPA, state and local government, and public interests. The
ride has not always been smooth, but the Corps is one of the few who has
navigated these waters often and often successfully.
3.2 The Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP)
This paper introduced and charted the origins of the Defense
Environmental Restoration Program in Section 2.2.2. In simpler terms,
3 0 1bid., p. 136.
31 Major General Patrick J. Kelly, "The Greening of the Corps---A Balanced Approach in
Protecting Wetlands," The Military Engineer (Alexandria, Virginia: The Society of American
Military Engineers, March-April 1991), p. 31.
3 2 1bid.
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DERP is the program that provides DOD with authorization and money to
clean-up certain environmental problems at currently used military
installations and formerly used DOD sites. The statutory goals of the
program include the correction of: (1) environmental problems from
hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants; (2) environmental
damage which creates an imminent and substantial endangerment to the
public health or welfare or the environment; and (3) unsafe buildings and
structures. 33 Along with the cleanup program, DERP provides for a
program of research, development and demonstration with respect to
hazardous wastes. 34 On the Army side, the purpose of the Installation
Restoration Program (IRP) is "to provide a structured but flexible approach
for identifying, evaluating, and cleaning-up sites for which the Army is
responsible where hazardous substances have been released to the
environment." 3 5
3.2.1 Recent Results
As required, the Department of Defense submitted its 1991 annual
report to Congress detailing its progress in the Defense Environmental
Restoration Program in February (the report covering Fiscal Year 1990).
Highlights from their report follow.
The focus of DERP continued to be investigating and cleaning-up
contaminated DOD sites and formerly used properties. Over 96% of the
funds went to the Installation Restoration Program. Other significant efforts
included R&D, waste minimization and management system improvements.
3310 U.S. Code 2701(b).
3410 U.S. Code 2702.
3 5 /RP, Guidance and Procedure, p. I-1.
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By September 1990, 89 DOD installations and 12 formerly used
properties were on EPA's NPL. Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Studies
were ongoing at 81 of these installations. Removal actions and/or interim
remedial actions were conducted at 68. The number of sites covered by the
IRP increased by 20 percent to more than 17,000 at over 1,800
installations. Most of these new sites are due to the inclusion of more than
200 smaller installations, such as Army Reserve Centers. By year's end,
Preliminary Assessments were completed at over 16,000 of the sites and
Site Inspections at more than 9,000. Remedial Investigations/Feasibility
Studies were under way or completed at over 1,400.
Work was completed and no further action was needed at more than
6,300 of the sites. Most of those sites requiring no further action represent
instances where studies have shown that no threat exists to either human
health or the environment.
DOD signed Interagency Agreements with EPA and the states for 31
of their NPL installations, bringing the number of installations with signed
agreements for site investigation and cleanup to 51. Lastly, Defense and
State Memoranda of Agreement were finalized between the Department of
Defense and 12 states.3 6
3 6 Glen Burg, "Environmental Digest--Defense Environmental Progress Reported," The
Military Engineer (Alexandria, Virginia: The Society of American Military Engineers, July
1991), p. 22.
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3.2.2 Program Strengths
As shown above, the Installation Restoration Program consumes the
majority of the attention and funds of DERP. USACE is responsible for
executing the Army's Installation Restoration Program. This program is
representative of the Navy and Air Force Programs (in fact, USACE is
heavily involved in every aspect of the Air Force cleanup program). I've
reviewed each program and studied the Army's IRP in depth. Because of
both the Corps' involvement in the Army's IRP and its similarity to the other
armed services' programs, this paper will primarily examine and discuss only
the Army's program and apply the lessons across-the-board.
3.2.2.1 Meets the Letter of the Law
The Defense Environmental Restoration Program, as well as its
satellite programs are meticulous in negotiating the myriad of requirements
demanded by CERCLA and SARA. A detailed study of how well DERP
meets the strictures of the law is beyond the scope and purpose of this
paper. Figure 3.1 graphically portrays DOD's system for meeting the letter
of the law.
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Outline of DOD Responsibilities in Implementing SARA, CERCLA,
and National Contingency Plan Requirements 3 7
-* Information Flow from OSD
Source: Mitre Corp. Figure 3.1
3.2.2.2. Fixes Responsibility
One of the strengths of the Installation Restoration Program is in how it
fixes responsibility at both the macro and micro levels. At the macro-level,
the Department of Defense understands it is responsible for much of the
existing waste. Likewise it understands that it must fund the clean-up. It is
important to note here that nowhere in the IRP guidance or supplemental
guidance is there anything written or implied that indicates the standard for
clean-up can be something less than federal, state, or local standards. The
guidance, just published, offers no double-standard for compliance, but
assumes the Carter rule, requiring federal agencies to be held to the same
environmental standards as private industry. 3 8 Coordination with state and
3 7 D. Casagrande, Department of Defense Requirements in the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (McLean, VA: Mitre Corp., Oct. 1987), p. 2-2.
3 8 Pragmatically, as the Regean Administration contended, states have no legal leverage
over federally owned territories by soveriegn immunity. In this same vein, executive
agencies have no legal recourse against eachother when both have valid or just competing
interests because of the "unitary theory of the executive" principal. The IRP however,
assumes no conflict and works in good faith to meet the interests of all the stakeholders.
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local agencies is required throughout the IRP. As outlined earlier, the Army
has additional requirements not included in Superfund such as annual
reports to congress and technical review committees.
At the micro, or action-level, the guidance goes to great length to detail
individual roles and responsibilities. It identifies and explains who the
decision makers are at the installation level and for what they are each
accountable. This plays-off the strengths of an organization like the military:
identify who's in charge, define his role, then reward or punish him for the
results (task, conditions, and standard). Under SARA Sections 120 and
211, DOD is required to provide information to Congress and the EPA on
several levels. Installations play a pivotal role in generating and initiating
information flow. Figure 3.2 graphically represents the flow.
Central Role of DOD Installation for Information
Flow in SARA Mandates 39
Source: Mitre Corp. Figure 3.2
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3 9 Casagrande, p. 1-11
==I
3.2.2.3. Action Oriented
Another strength of DERP and the IRP is that they are action
documents. They set out workable timetables and again play-off a results
oriented organization--the military. The IRP looks for tangible results each
step of the process. The best example of how the guidance works towards
the ultimate goal of program (to clean up the mess) is in setting-up operable
units. The guidance sets-up and defines operable units to be:
Parts of remedial actions [that] may be implemented separately: to
achieve significant reductions in risk while other parts of the remedial
action are being evaluated, selected, or designed; to provide a
construction management tool for implementing large, complex, or
multi-year remedial actions; or to expedite the completion of total site
cleanup. While operable units are implemented before or after
selection of the final remediation, they should not be inconsistent
with the final action nor preclude its implementation. 40
Operable units offer DOD flexibility in how it approaches the cleanup.
It can allow them to remedy the non-controversial portions of a site while
seeking remedy or consensus for others. Most importantly, it means that
they don't have to swallow the whole pill in order to move toward
accomplishing the mission--cleaning-up the mess. This creates positive
possibilities in prioritization, funding, contracting and public participation.
Figure 3.3 below graphically illustrates the process.
vp"is Optional
Source: Army IRP Figure 3.3
4 0 IRP, Guidance and Procedure, p. 111-55.
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3.2.2.4 The Rocky Mountain Arsenal
Interim Response Actions (IRAs) come about from operational units.
An example of how the guidance can allow the Corps to work towards
cleaning the mess up can be found in its actions at the Rocky Mountain
Arsenal (RMA).
Located north of Denver's Stapleton International Airport, the Rocky
Mountain Arsenal is one of the nation's largest hazardous waste sites.
From the 1940's to the 1980's, it was used by the Army to make chemical
munitions including incendiaries and blister and nerve agents, and by several
lessees to manufacture chemicals, primarily pesticides. RMA is currently
the subject of the largest RI/FS (Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study) in
history. The Record of Decision for the facility will not be completed until
1994, and the final remedy will not be finished until after the turn of the
century.
Thirteen Interim Response Actions (IRAs) were identified by the Army,
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Colorado Department of Health,
and Shell Oil Company to be conducted prior to the final remedy for RMA.
The purpose of the IRAs was to attack major problems early on by using
standardized and rapidly implemented remediation techniques where
feasible. The IRA for the liquids, sludges, and soils at Basin F is the largest
of these actions.
Basin F was a 93-acre asphalt-lined basin with a liquid capacity of
over 240 million gallons. It was used as an evaporation pond for liquid
wastes from manufacturing facilities from 1956 through 1981. The highly
toxic liquids, sludges, and contaminated soils in and under the basin
contained heavy metals, pesticides, pesticide by-products, and other
40
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contaminated soils from under the liner; and placing the stabilized material in
a RCRA-equivalent double-lined temporary storage pile built in the former
basin. The final disposition of the liquid and stabilized solid material is being
* handled as a subsequent phase to this IRA.41
While the Rocky Mountain Arsenal is far from being completely
* cleaned, the Corps was able to take immediate action on some of its most
pressing problems. The key here is that there is progress, however
incremental, towards complete remediation. No one proposes the problem
is solved, especially since no feasible means of complete remediation has
been discovered. The difference between RMA and most other NPL sites is
that action, not deliberation, ruled the day.
3.2.3 Program Weaknesses
3.2.3.1 Shares Superfund's Problems
DERP, and especially the Installation Restoration Program are written
to meet both the letter and intent of the Superfund legislation. Thus, one of
DERP's strengths also makes it one of weaknesses--especially in terms of
process. In the discussion of the problem, this paper presented a broad-
brushed, results-oriented overview of what is wrong with Superfund. The
41Dl D. Gabel and Ronald E. Versaw, "Interim Response Action at the Rocky Mountain
Arsenal," The Miitary Engineer,Vol. 83, No. 543, July 1991, p. 40.
41
wastes. Ebasco Services Inc. was contracted by the Army Corps of
Engineers to perform the IRA on Basin F.
This $36 million construction project consisted of transferring residual
Basin F liquids to temporary storage tanks and double-lined holding basins;
excavating and stabilizing the asphalt liner, overlying sludges, and
conta inated soils fro  under the liner; and placing the stabilized aterial in
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purpose of this section is to present more elemental sources of CERCLA's
problems. Why and how is the process inconsistent? What are the failings
and problems with the way decisions are tied to risk and risk assessment--a
problem DERP shares with CERCLA?
3.2.3.1.1 Inconsistency
The Science Advisory Board recently completed a report to EPA
administrator William Reilly on national environmental issues and risks. This
board determined that inconsistency was the factor primarily responsible for
our environmental policy woes. Their insight is paraphrased in the following
paragraphs.
Over the past 20 years, this country has put into place extensive and
detailed government policies to control a number of environmental problems.
In hindsight, many of those efforts have been inconsistent, uncoordinated,
and thus less effective than they could have been. The fragmentary nature
of U.S. environmental policy has been evident in three ways:
* In Laws. As different environmental problems were identified, new
laws were passed to address each one. However, the tactics and goals of
the different laws were neither consistent nor coordinated, even if the
pollutants to be controlled were the same.
* In Programs. The Environmental Protection Agency was
established as the primary federal agency responsible for implementing the
nation's environmental laws. Through EPA an administrative structure
evolved wherein each program was primarily responsible for implementing
specific laws. Consequently, the efforts of the different programs rarely
were coordinated, even if they were attempting to control different aspects
of the same environmental problem.
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* In Tools. So-called "end-of-pipe" controls and remediation
technologies have almost always been applied because of (constricting)
federal, state, or local legal requirements. 42
3.2.3.1.2 Risk and Risk Assessment
In the environmental policy arena, risk is seen as the probability of a
harm. The root of disagreement in environmental disputes--particularly in
sitings and cleanups--is finding exactly what is an acceptable amount of risk
to the public. When is the public interest served? Former EPA chief,
William Ruckelshaus, defines risk assessment as "an exercise that combines
available data on a substance's potency in causing adverse health effects
with information about likely human exposure, and through the use of
plausible assumptions, it generates an estimate of human health risk." 43 A
rationalist would view this as a problem of finding where societal costs and
public benefits meet. Translated in terms of environmental risk assessment:
The public costs (for the PRP or Superfund) of cleaning up a site to 1-part-
per-million is balanced by the chance of only one person in ten million
becoming ill (public benefit). This rationalist view governed much of our
existing policy.
4 2 Glen Burg, "Environmental Digest--Setting Priorities and Strategies for Environmental
Protection," The Military Engineer (Alexandria, Virginia: The Society of American Military
Engineers, March-April 1991), p. 28. At the request of EPA administrator William K. Reilly,
the Science Advisory Board (SAB) completed a report on national environmental issues and
risks. To carry out this study, the Board created a special "Risk Reduction Strategies
Committee" composed of 39 Scientists and experts from academia, state government,
industry, and public interest groups. The above is excerpted from the executive summary of
that committee's findings.
4 3 William D. Ruckelshaus, "Risk, Science, and Democracy," Issues in Science and
Technology (Washington D.C.: National Academy of Science, Spring 1985), p.28.
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Our Superfund experience has shown the risk assessment issue to be
divided into two quarters, with a good degree of fence straddling between
the two. Milton Russell highlights the dichotomy when he writes,
To risk managers, and those comfortable with modern
technology, pollution is an externality of production and consumption;
its reduction is to be pursued vigorously to the point that maximizes
the total public interest...To others, though, reflecting traditional and
deeply held values, pollution is a violation of personal rights; its
generation is an evil, and its reduction is a matter of moral
principal.44
Two lessons are particularly germane: the failure of what Dennis
Ducsik named the "Decide-Announce-Defend" model4 5, and the power of
"NIMBYism" (Not In My Back Yard) within the local citizenry. The first of
these demonstrates that there is a systematic problem in trying to define
that elusive point where costs and benefits are optimized--especially when
done in a vacuum. The second has forcefully brought home the fact that
because a remedy is technically feasible, and "fair" in pursuit of the overall
good, it can not necessarily be forced on an unwilling citizenry.
3.2.3.2 Buried Environmental Offices
The top echelons of command and policy-making in the Department
of Defense hierarchy are indeed placing a new priority on hazardous waste
minimization and remediation. Their budget for cleanups, investigations,
and research and development point toward a greening of DOD. While
policy-making, priority-setting, and R&D are centrally driven and executed,
4 4 Milton Russell, "Risk-Based Environmental Protection," Issues in Science and Technology
(Washington D.C.: National Academy of Science, Spring 1987), p. 13.
4 5 Dennis W. Ducsik, "Electricity Planning and the Environment: Toward a New Role for
Government in the Decision Process," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Civil
Engineering, M.I.T., Cambridge, Massachusetts, January, 1978.
44
the actual execution of the cleanup program (the IRP) is decentralized. As
shown earlier, the installation is the hub of activity in the process. The jury
is out on just how green the middle tiers of command have become.
One weakness in the IRP and the system for action it outlines is in the
relative importance of the installation's Remedial Project Manager (RPM).
This individual is usually the installation's environmental coordinator and is
commonly found working under the Directorate of Engineering and Housing
(DEH) on the post. In the Army hierarchy, this means that the RPM is not
someone who would necessarily "have the bosses ear." More often than
not, the RPM would not be a prime player in the day-to-day mission of the
installation unless a cleanup, or public pressure, or some other factor he
controlled impacted upon that installation mission. The guidance is not
written to lessen or diminish the importance of this player, but his place in
the hierarchy places him in a reactive position--one who's importance
becomes apparent only in crisis--rather than in a place where he can
anticipate and garner command emphasis and resources. Much like the
market, hazardous waste has traditionally been an externality, or the cost of
doing business for old-school commanders and, until the hard lesson is
learned, the IRP may just be another one of the many responsibilities the
commander has that he trusts a subordinate to execute.
3.2.3.3 Confusion about the "Stick"
Nowhere in the study of Superfund and DERP is there more confusion
than over EPA's enforcement authority over the Department of Defense:
Environmentalists claim foul. Corps of Engineer officials understand
45
"Federal sovereignty" to be waived for Superfund. 46 DERP and IRP are
written with explicit rules for ensuring both EPA and local requirements are
met and nowhere mention a double standard. Environmental lawyers
understand the system, but are slow to tell. Michael Renner provides the
environmentalists' indictment:
The military sector has long considered itself beyond the
purview of existing environmental laws and regulations. Public
awareness of environmental problems generated by military activities
is important if the government agencies and their private contractors
who inflicted the damage are to be held to greater accountability.
In 1978, President Carter signed an executive order demanding
that all U.S. federal facilities comply with the government's
environmental regulations. But the Reagan administration left the
Pentagon to police itself, assigning it sole responsibility for base
cleanups. Representative John Dingell of Michigan complained in
1988 that "the Defense Department's attitude varies between
reluctant compliance and active disregard for the law.
The Environmental Protection Agency's powers to enforce
environmental laws on military bases, meanwhile, are severely
circumscribed, as are those of OSHA. The Justice Department has
prevented EPA from suing other federal agencies, from imposing
cleanup orders on them without their consent, or from fining them.
And it has gone to court several times to preclude state agencies
form fining federal installations. In consequence, EPA has had to
settle for negotiating "voluntary compliance agreements" of doubtful
value with the military.4 7
State of the Word, 1991
The military takes a different view, citing that possible fines and
injunctions can severely limit, or even eliminate an installation's operational
capability. Like criminal penalties, fines vary depending on the violated
statute, but are generally $25,000 per day per violation. This directly
affects the installation's resources. The money to pay these administrative
4 6 0bservation based on a 6 August 1991 interview with Tony Riccio, Chief, Environmental
Office, USACE New England Division, Waltham Massachusetts, in particular; and other
Corps personnel throughout my research.
4 7 Renner, p. 151.
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fines comes from the installation's operation and maintenance funds (O&M).
Since violations can occur over several days, weeks, or even months, the
impact on base operations could be debilitating. As significant as these
fines can be, the most devastating enforcement option available to
regulators is a court injunction. If the transgression involves something as
fundamental as industrial wastewater (sewage) or vapor recovery (fuels
management), the installation's ability to perform its military mission is
stopped. 48
Mary McCabe, an environmental lawyer for USACE New England
Division, clearly and skillfully explains the system for dispute avoidance, but
leaves unresolved questions of enforceability between executive agencies
and between state and federal agencies (sovereign immunity). She explains
that for federal facilities on the NPL, the EPA has developed a model
interagency agreement known as the Federal Facilities Agreement. This
agreement sets forth a system of dispute resolution. If attempts at the site
to informally resolve the dispute fail, a written statement of dispute is sent
to the Dispute Resolution Committee (comprised of one member from each
party). The DRC members are likely to be heads of a division or regional
office. If this committee cannot resolve the dispute in 21 days, action is
forwarded to a Senior Executive committee, made up of two members at
the regional level. If that is unsuccessful, the dispute can be elevated to the
Administrator of EPA or the Army Secretariat. The Administrator of EPA
makes the final decision.
4 8 Major Richard A. Phelps, USAF, "Environmental Management Offices--Key to the Air
Force's Future Viability," The Military Engineer,Vol. 83, No. 543, July 1991, p. 44.
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Because EPA and DOD are both executive branch agencies, it is
important to have a dispute resolution procedure in place. It is not at all
clear whether one executive branch agency can sue another executive
branch agency. Since both agencies are within the same branch of
government, they represent the same party (the executive). There would be
no case or controversy because there would only be one party involved in
the dispute. It also provides that DOD will pay stipulated penalties for
failing to abide by the provisions of the agreement. The interagency
agreements are signed by EPA, DOD and the state (the state participates
because CERCLA assures the state of an opportunity to plan and select the
remedial action). EPA regional offices have not uniformly accepted EPA HQ
resolution of the issues addressed in the model federal facilities agreement.
The incongruity among EPA regions lengthens the negotiating process and
prevents DOD from anticipating uniform consequences to its response
actions throughout the country. 49
My view is that a stick does exist. EPA has the final say in the
standard of cleanup or they can hit an installation where it hurts--in their
operating budgets or in their ability to perform their mission. The
environmentalists' concerns are most likely rooted in the fact that the stick
is not in their hands and the process can go forward without their weighted
involvement, as is the case with non-DOD sites (note to all current
competitors and potential entrants into the remediation market).
4 9 Maureen Ann McCabe, An Introduction to the Defense Environmental Restoration
Program (Washington D.C.: a thesis submitted to the National Law Center, George
Washington University, September 1990), pp. 89-92.
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3.2.3.4. R&D/Technology's Slow Crawl
Established technologies such as stabilization and incineration
are still specified in nearly two-thirds of the cleanup plans, according
to the report by EPA's Office of Solid Waste and Emergency
Response. There are now more than 1,200 sites on the Superfund
National Priorities List...(and) despite the growing numbers, few
innovative technologies have yet to make their way through the entire
cleanup pipeline. 50
Much like the rest of the players in Superfund, Department of Defense
cleanups suffer from a lack of innovative cleanup technologies. The forces
that constrain remediation engineers in designing solutions to individual
cleanup problems are active whether the customer is DOD, DOE, EPA, or a
private company. Inconsistencies in both the legislation and the programs,
liability issues, and the paper-trail have all been discussed earlier.
Professors C. A. Geffen and J. F. Keller of the Pacific Northwest
Laboratory offer another, more subtle explanation of the problem.
EPA's current approach to hazardous waste site remediation is
based on the assumption that all important information about a site
can be known before remediation begins. This approach, based on
the conventional engineering paradigm of study, design and
construct, leads to the selection of a single remedial alternative with
no contingencies for variations encountered during construction. This
conventional approach works well for traditional engineering activities
(i.e., building bridges), where uncertainty can largely be eliminated by
study and investigation and by the existence of a large body of
empirical evidence. However, hazardous conditions, geohydrology,
transport mechanisms, waste source, and chemical and physical
characteristics make it impossible to completely characterize and
understand actual site conditions. This, the remedial process has to a
large extent become "bottlenecked" by the uncertainties associated
with fully understanding the nature of hazardous waste problems.
DOE needs to understand and manage these uncertainties within the
current and evolving regulatory framework.
5 0
"Technologies Gain Slow Nod," ENR, 11 March 1991, p.15.
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To manage uncertainties associated with the environmental
restoration process, DOE should take into account regulatory,
science, and engineering considerations throughout the process.
Classically, scientists tend to be responsible for the remedial
investigation (RI) portion of the process, with the engineers generally
not involved until the feasibility study (FS) phase. The engineering
input early in the CERCLA process will help keep the process focused
and ensure that the information obtained through characterization is
useful for engineering purposes. Scientific input in the later stages
(i.e., during the FS portion of the CERCLA process) will ensure that
the alternatives/technologies chosen are protective of the
environment. Regulatory, scientific, and engineering input should be
incorporated into all phases of the cleanup process, from initial
planning to post-closure monitoring. 5 1
DOD, through its use of DERP and the Installation Restoration
Program, suffers through the same institutional barricades as DOE (for
whom the above analysis was conducted). Again, hazardous waste is a
new and unique problem and time-honored, institutionally-driven
methodologies may not lead to effective solutions. DOD should also look to
change the process in order to accept uncertainty in test-bed technologies.
Leaders and policy makers in DOD and EPA see and understand the
problems above and are working to push innovative solutions to their
environmental problems, but change comes slow. Walter W. Kovalick,
director of EPA's Technology Innovation Office, noted that in the spring of
'91, EPA planed to issue a policy statement "that shows our intention to
have incentives for innovative technologies. We must consider ways to
show we'll either provide funding or give extra time to complete the
project." 52 Rather than strive to find the answer in one of it's four
laboratories or in-house, USACE should also actively look for the answer in
51 C. A. Geffen and J. F. Keller, Strategies for Environmental Restoration In An Evolving
Regulatory Environment (Richland, Washington: Pacific Northwest Laboratory, March
1990), pp. 7-8.
5 2
"Technologies Gain Slow Nod," ENR, 11 March 1991, p. 15.
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industry, providing a market and clearing the path with incentives for
technological innovations.
3.3 Market Analysis
The hazardous waste segment, however risky an investment, is
definitely positioned for a boom. U.S. industry now generates more
than 275 million m.t./year of hazardous waste,...leading to a $4-
billion cleanup industry that is growing at the rate of 25%-35%/year.
By the end of this year, an estimated $4-$5 billion will be spent on
hazardous waste services, and that should reach $9 billion by
1992. 5 3
Chemicalweek, 11 October 1990
While the Corps and academia race to find technological solutions to
the remediation problem in-house, the greatest probability for success may
lie in the market. Driven by the opportunity for sustainable profits and
growth, firms should be pushing their limits to gain first-mover advantages.
Why aren't they? What is it about this market structure that relegates firms
to a fast-follower market strategy, while customers would pay a premium
now for workable innovations?
In his first two books, Competitive Strategy and Competitive
Advantage, Harvard Business Professor Michael Porter provides a useful
methodology for analyzing markets and how firms compete in different
markets. He introduces many tools that first tell a firm how to assess their
industry, then how to formulate a strategy to sustain a competitive
advantage over rivals. This portion of the thesis will use applicable tools
from both these books to better understand the hazardous waste
remediation industry and find what changes could better garner more
innovative technologies. Porter's industry segmentation and five
5 3 Lisa Tantillo, "Wall Street Likes What It Sees," Chemicalweek, 11 October, p. 25.
competitive forces will provide this insight. Lastly, we will analyze the risks
and opportunities in pursuing first-mover advantages by innovation.
3.3.1 Industry Segmentation
"With an 8.3 percent share of the gross national product (GNP) in
1989, construction remains the largest industry in the United States, a
position it has held for the past six years," 54 reads the opening sentence of
the 1990 Cumulative Supplement to KPMG Peat Marwick's Construction
Accounting Manual. The construction industry is not homogeneous.
Segments of the construction industry differ greatly in their structural
attractiveness to competitors and future entrants. Composed of 1.2 million
firms55, this is particularly important in a fragmented industry like
construction, where there are no Exxons or AT&Ts--it is impossible to be all
things to all people. As opposed to market segmentation, which tends to
focus on the marketing activities in the value chain, industry segmentation
combines buyer purchasing behavior with the behavior of costs (both
production costs and the costs of serving different buyers). 56 Porter's
segmentation matrix from Competitive Advantage provides a framework to
view and analyze the construction industry, the existing market forces, and
the role of government in the emerging hazardous waste market.
Segmenting and analyzing only the environmental services industry is
not useful to this study for two reasons. First, such a narrow segmentation
neglects many of the factors that influence the relationships of the five
5 4 John L. Callan, "The U.S. Construction Industry," Peat Marwick Goodkin Report, Vol. 90-
2, p. 3.
5 5 Martin, p. 120.
5 6 Michael E. Porter, Competitive Advantage (New York: The Free Press, 1985), p. 232.
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competitive forces, particularly between segments. 57 Next, a narrow
segmentation, perhaps by technology (as in earlier Figure 2.2), shows what
exists now in terms of product but lends no insight to either new
technologies or customers. Both of these seem particularly important from
my perspective since the technological answers have yet to be found and
the ultimate purpose of this study is to find from where the "carrot" for
innovation should come. However, I feel a strong case can be made to
analyze the emerging industry as a segment of the construction industry.
Construction, as an industry, is diverse and complex. The matrix
offered at Figure 3.4 proves a useful tool in understanding how and why
hazardous waste services are actually part of a larger market and the
framework for further strategic analysis.
Segmentation Matrix of the Construction Industry (Partial)
Product Design Horiz. Vert. H.W. H.W. Mega- Global
Bu er Constr. Constr. Minim. Remed. projects mkts >
EPA
(Superfund)
P DOD
U
B DOE
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State
Agencies
P Petrol
R Chemical
I Manufacture
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A Other
T Industries
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Figure 3.4
5 7 Robert D. Buzzell, Note on Market Definition and Segmentation, (Cambridge,
Massachussets: Harvard Business School Case No. 579-083, 1979), pp. 10-12.
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On the horizontal axis are the broadly grouped services provided by
the industry, including the emerging hazardous waste services (H.W.
remediation and H.W. minimization). On the vertical axis are the broadly
grouped customers or buyers. Note that these are additionally grouped into
public and private. I've done this because of the unique impact each of
these sectors has on the five competitive forces in the construction industry
(in no small way due to the impact of the Federal Acquisition Regulation).
For a construction or engineering firm, differences in the firm's competitive
strategies for competing in various segments increase as the distances
across the matrix between segments increase.
The usefulness of the segmentation matrix depends particularly upon
separating "product varieties" and "customers" into meaningful pairings.
Our first choice is whether to examine hazardous waste services as part of a
larger construction industry or treat it as its own industry. I've chosen to
look at it in the larger context--understanding that some of the largest
competitors to date in the segment may not have roots in the traditional
construction industry. The reasons are compelling:
* In the remediation services, the preponderance of work done
throughout the first ten years of CERCLA has been site evaluation, risk
assessment, and to a great extent litigation. The next decade promises an
explosion of projects in the pipeline to progress to the design and
construction stages of the process.58
* Again in the remediation sector, many of the "products/services" in
the value chain mirror those in the traditional construction process: An
owner with little expertise, a designer who proposes a solution to the
54
5 8 Leighton, p. 16.
problem, and a contractor who actually puts spade to ground and "builds"
the project; a contract that details the relationship of the three and
allocates risk; a product that is often-times a "one-off"; a gauntlet of codes
to meet and inspections to arrange and pass throughout the process; use of
sub-contractors who lend to the process skills or proprietary processes
integral to the ultimate success of the project; unique insurance and
bonding requirements, and not least of all; the managerial expertise and
physical capacity to execute a large amount of traditional construction
(particularly horizontal work).
* In the minimization sector, construction will be involved in the
creating a cleaner industrial base and refitting older, "dirtier" factories.
Whether, as an industry, construction decides to vertically integrate and
offer design in-house, or execute traditional vertical construction and sub-
work as part of an outside design service, its participation is assured.
* A history of contractual work in both the public and private sector
for both design and "product delivery."
* Lastly, the rush of large, multi-national construction firms to hire
expertise and add environmental services to their platter introduces
heavyweights with considerable resources to what has been a focused
market.
The second dimension of the buyers axis, public versus private,
segregates the role of public construction on the industry. Federally funded
construction accounts for over seventeen percent of all construction in the
United States. 59 This is only part of the public construction. When state
5 9 This is based upon KPMG Peat Marwick placing the U.S. construction industry at roughly
$350 billion per year from 1987 thru 1990, and President Bush's '92 budget proposal at
roughly $60 billion.
budgets for prisons, hospitals, transportation, infrastructure, universities,
and now hazardous cleanups are added, the impact of public construction
on the entire industry cannot be overstated. The table in Figure 3.5 shows
the President's 1991 and 1992 Federal construction budget. Note both the
sheer size of the budget and the increases in environmental commitments.
In a fragmented industry such as construction, Uncle Sam is far and away
the market's biggest customer--an impact player.
Proposed Federal Construction Budgets 60
Category 1991 est. 1992 Bush prop. % chg.
Highway Obligations $15.675 bil. $16.272 bil. 4%
Highway Obligation ceiling $14.5 bil. $15.772 bil. 8%
Military construction $5.0 bil. $4.5 bil. -10%
DOD family housing $3.3 bil. $3.6 bil. 9%
DOE environmental mgmt. $3.2 bil. $4.6 bil. 44%
DOE conservation and
renewable energy R&D
Superfund
FAA airport limit grant
EPA construction grants/loan fund
EPA Clean Air Implementation
Corps construction
DOD environmental restoration
BuRec construction
Supercollider
GSA new construction
Mass Transit
$423 mil.
$1.616 bil.
$1.8 bil
$2.1 bil.
$339 mil.
$1.375 bil.
$1.1 bil.
$692 mil.
$267 mil.
$1.461 bil.
$3.259 bil.
$494 mil.
$1.750 bil.
$1.9 bil.
$1.9 bil.
$516 mil
$1.482 bil.
$1.3 bil.
$618 mil.
$534 mil.
$477 mil.
$3.329 bil.
17%
8%
6%
-10%
35%
8%
18%
-11%
100%
-67%
2%
Source: ENR, Feb 91 Figure 3.5
60Tom Ichniowski, et. al., "Budget Favors Environment," ENR, 11 February 1991, p. 9.
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The share of the budget allocated to environmental services is
growing. Figure 3.6 portrays the environmental share of the current Federal
construction budget. This does not include state budgets and cleanups or
the huge volume of other kinds of now-legal wastes, generated by mines,
steel mills, and paint plants. 6 1
1992 Federal Construction Budget:
Environmental Share
Other Construction
($49 billion)
82.95%Environmental
($10.1 billion)
17.05%
Figure 3.6
As the primary construction agency for the Department of Defense,
the Corps of Engineers finds itself directly involved in purchasing about $10
billion per year (or 16 percent) of federal construction. This does not count
the numerous instances the Corps represents other Federal agencies in
letting construction contracts. 62 Figure 3.7 graphically represents DOD's
share of the segmentation matrix as a customer.
1992 Federal Construction Budget:
DOD Share
Other Construction
($48.2 billion)
81.57%
DOD Construction
($10.9 billion)
1'Q Al0&
Figure 3.7
6 1Karen Heller, "The Garbage Heap Is Where It's At," Chemicalweek, 11 October 1989,
p.25. While these don't classify as trash or hazardous waste, Heller makes a case that it isjust a matter of time before they too will be regulated.6 2 As an example, the New England Division does most of the contracting for EPA in the
northeast per 6 August interview with Tony Riccio, Chief, Environmental Office, USACE
New England Division.
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3.3.2 Five Competitive Forces
The strength and interaction of five competitive forces determine an
industry's profitability--the entry of new competitors, the threat of
substitutes, the bargaining power of buyers, the bargaining power of
suppliers, and the rivalry among the existing competitors. Industry
profitability is not a function of what the product looks like or whether it
embodies high or low technology, but of industry structure. The five forces
determine industry profitability because they influence the prices, costs, and
required investment of firms in an industry--the elements of return on
investment. 63 The goal in this analysis is to show how the buyer--in this
case the Federal government--can influence the five forces to stimulate
competitors to be more aggressive in seeking innovative technologies for the
cleanup problem.
3.3.2.1 High Threat of New Entrants
Large construction firms represent the largest share of new entrants
to the hazardous waste services markets. These new entrants bring new
capacity, a strong desire to gain a share of the market, and substantial
resources to the table. The strength of this competitive force depends upon
barriers to entry and reaction from existing competitors. With the current
vacuum in meeting the needs of the market, reaction from existing
competitors is not yet a factor in our analysis. Erecting effective barriers to
entry remains one of the most potent weapons in a firm's competitive
strategy.
6 3 Porter, Competitive Advantage, pp. 4-5.
58
Of the seven major sources of barriers to entry (economies of scale,
product differentiation, capital requirements, switching costs, access to
distribution channels, cost disadvantages independent of scale, and
government policy), capital requirements and cost disadvantages
independent of scale have particular influence in this market segment.
Currently, the threat of entry is high in the hazardous waste market. What
is obvious from reading the papers is borne out in examining these two key
sources.
Because this is both a new and rapidly expanding market with no
clear technological "answer," entry capital requirements are mixed. The
barrier to entry is low for firms bartering low-risk, approved technological
processes. For them, relatively small capital is required for up-front
advertising, R&D, production facilities, customer credit, inventories,
covering start-up losses, or other traditional initial capital sunk costs. For
firms pursuing innovative technologies, high research and development
costs and risks combine with a long period of market acceptance and entry
to create a sizeable barrier to entry. In this light, it's easy to see why firms
are rushing to enter the market but not to find innovative answers to the
cleanup problem. Without a front-running remediation technique, the most
important start-up cost is "know-how." In the larger scheme, this is
relatively inexpensive.
Another reason the threat of entry is high is the current clear lack of
cost disadvantages independent of scale. There are no important
proprietary process technologies, process know-how or design
characteristics kept proprietary through patents or secrecy. Additionally,
there are no preferential government subsidies which would give firms
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lasting advantages in the market. Lastly, there are no "cost advantages"
held by firms now in the market due to learning or experience curves.
Not all the factors at work in the current industry make it attractive
for either new entrants or new technologies. The following are institutional
obstacles to both entry and technological innovation:
* Pollution Insurance. The hazardous waste contractors insurance
program could include as many as eight insurance coverage parts:
Commercial General Liability Insurance; Contractors Pollution Liability;
Architects and Engineers Errors and Omissions; Specialty Environmental
Engineers Errors and Omissions Policy; Asbestos Abatement Liability;
Asbestos Consultant's Errors and Omissions; Commercial Automobile
Liability; Worker's Compensation, and; Specialty Policies. The average
premium for the insurance increased to as much as 11 times its 1982 level.
* Bonding. Bonding companies are equally uneasy about becoming
involved in the hazardous waste services market. Courts are unreasonably
holding contractors and sureties responsible above and beyond the terms of
the contract, even if claims turn up years after the cleanup is completed.
* Financing. Wall Street analysts have taken strong notice of the
growth in the environmental engineering and contracting markets. These
funds (Openheimer, Fidelity,...) tend to focus on the large environmental
firms. The market is not as aggressive for smaller companies and seems to
have an uneasiness about investing in companies that perform research and
development in hazardous waste. "Major companies and venture capitalists
are nervous about possibly being held liable for any environmental damage
that occurs from the use of a new process" states Oppenheimer's Paul
Zonfass. Lending institutions are also wary of becoming involved with
companies that perform hazardous waste cleanups.
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* EPA Institutional Obstacles. The government itself can be one of
the main barriers to commercialization of innovative technologies.
Superfund project managers must develop records of decision (RODs) that
will stand the test of engineering review, public scrutiny, regulatory
requirements and even court verified legality. This tends to create an
environment that will make the ROD process risk-averse and therefore
biased away from innovative technologies. The ROD must promote a
technology that is effective the first time. There are programmatic obstacles
as well as institutional ones (the RCRA "land-ban; the Best Demonstrated
Available Technology (BDAT) for the waste; SARAs cost recovery
provisions; EPAs procurement procedures; and sole source procurement
processes).64
What can government or policy makers do to make both the small
firm pursue technological advances while the entry barriers are low and the
industry giants pursue technology advances in order to raise these entry
barriers?
3.3.2.2 Low Intensity Among Existing Competitors
The principal reason there is little internal rivalry in the hazardous
waste remediation market may be that the industry is so new. Typically, as
an industry matures, growth rates and profits decline, resulting in intensified
rivalries. This sector is an infant in a dynamic market--there is a backlog of
work for all current competitors.
6 4 Andrew Hoffman, The Hazardous Waste Remediation Market: Innovative Technology
Development and the Growing Involvement of the Construction Industry (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: a thesis submitted to the Department of Civil Engineering, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, July 1991), pp. 64-72.
Another reason for the current lack of internal rivalry in this market
are the low exit barriers. Lack of specialized assets, low fixed costs to exit,
loose strategic interrelationships between the hazardous waste component
of the firm and the other subdivisions, and few if any emotional barriers in
within management make the cost of cutting losses and leaving the market
low. While this makes business comfortable for present and future
competitors, it does nothing to stimulate innovation. If necessity is the
mother of invention, the current market is an orphan.
Liability issues described in the following section of this thesis raise
doubt about the lack of exit barriers. Will the remediator be held fiscally
liable if the cleanliness standard changes years after the cleanup? At first
glance, this would appear to refute the above discussion. This future threat
would be an obvious exit barrier. I contend that remaining in the market in
no way alters or improves a firms ability to mitigate these future liability
issues. I don't think this issue would deter firms from leaving the market,
but only serves as an additional barrier to entry for the farsighted.
Diverse competitors, expansion into or invasion from the global
market, and high strategic stakes are all factors poised to rapidly intensify
the internal rivalry as the market matures. One technological breakthrough--
especially if proprietary--could send shock waves through the market and
spell the end of gentlemanly competition.
3.3.2.3 No Pressure From Substitute Products
One of the principal reasons that this industry is so attractive for
competitors is that there is no threat of substitution for the remediation
process. Without a clear-cut technological solution for any of the numerous
hazardous waste problems, it is unlikely the customer would switch. In fact
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the customer is likely to accept willingly any product it can get past EPA
and the local population. This service is mandated by law so in a broad
sense (that forwarded by Porter), no threat of substitution exists. In a
narrower sense, there is a threat of substitution by competing remediation
technologies. For a competing firm, there is a danger that their product will
become an insufficient or unacceptable remedy if baseline risk assessments
grow more restrictive.
3.3.2.4 High Bargaining Power of Buyers
The buyer in these market segments exert high bargaining power.
More so in the public sectors than the private, the EPA has review authority
in every phase of the remediation process. In this way, the buyer can exert
a tremendous amount of leverage over competitors. This paper has
introduced and discussed the way that the required meticulous
documentation influences engineers in designing and executing a
remediation. This is again another aspect of the way the current strength
and character of the five competitive forces attract numerous new
competitors, yet deter innovative technologies. Here, government
intervention is working against the market's desire and tendency to seek
competitive advantage instead of nurturing that desire.
3.3.2.5 Bargaining Power of Suppliers
Currently, suppliers exert little or no influence in the remediation
sectors of our segmentation matrix. The value-added for competing firms is
experience and know-how, not raw materials or subcontractors. Unless a
breakthrough remediation technology is dependent upon a supplier's skill or
materials, the influence of this competitive force is not likely to strengthen.
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Figure 3.8 illustrates the impact and interaction of Porter's five competitive
forces and entry barriers to technological innovators.
Porter's Five Competitive Forces and
The Hazardous Waste Remediation Market Segment
Potential
Potential Entry Barriers
Entrants for Technological
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Figure 3.8
3.3.3 Risks
In addition to evaluating the market in terms of Porter's five forces, a
useful tool in gaining insight into an industry or market segment is to
evaluate the risks to entrants and rivals. While some of the risks will
routinely surface in the above discussion, it is useful to inspect them
separately especially in the context of risk to the remediation technology
developer.
* Liability Risks associated with hazardous waste remediation work
arise out of the potential for accidental releases of hazardous substances
during the remediation process. Persons injured by hazardous chemicals
can potentially seek common law remedies through four legal actions:
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Trespass, nuisance, negligence, and strict liability. These remedies are
referred to as toxic torts. Another risk for the innovator is that he will be
held liable for a site if either the standard for cleanup increases in later years
or the technology tried has unforeseen by-products or latent side-effects (as
in bio-remediation or incineration today).
* Financial Risks to the technology developer manifest themselves in
several ways. The most obvious are the financial risks due to a law suit
judgement as discussed above. As mentioned in barriers to entry, a
financial risk particular to market are the large capital costs if a
technological first-mover strategy is pursued. The high research and
development/process equipment development costs coupled with the long
period of market acceptance or entry can make this a high financial risk
market.
* Business Risks to this market segment are not altogether different
than business risks to other innovative technology markets. The need
clearly exists for improved technologies and the market is still new, so the
business risks for a carefully designed technology may be no different than
those for any other business venture in a dynamic market.
* Market Risks are unusual for hazardous waste remediation. The
market is driven primarily by federal and, to a lesser extent state regulation,
as well as industry and public opinion. The risk for the hazardous
remediation market as a whole continuing is small. The risk for a particular
technology becoming unacceptable is far greater. An example would be the
increasing difficulty in siting a commercial incinerator facility. Again, the
concern resulting from unsteady regulations is the possibility that
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regulations and technology might change and leave companies liable for
what they thought they had cleaned up already. 65
3.3.4 Opportunities
What can government do to change this market segment's five
competitive forces to favor aggressive technological advances by the
competitors? To divorce government from the process is unreasonable.
The market exists because of legislation, and the day to day involvement of
the federal government as both regulator, inspector, and customer tie it
tightly to any solution. The question then becomes, "Which part(s) of the
government should become the agent for change?" For a firm, the choice
of whether to be a technological leader or follower is based on three
factors: The degree to which that firm can sustain its lead over competitors
in a technology; the advantages a firm reaps from being the first to adopt a
new technology, and; the disadvantages the firm faces by moving first
rather than waiting for others. 66
In order to court competitors into pursuing first-mover advantages
through technological innovation, the threat of entry in the market must be
altered. The goal should be twofold: First, we have an interest in keeping
the industry entry barriers low for new entrants. The difference is that by
some means we must force them lower for those firms--large and small--
who are willing to pursue new technologies. As mentioned above, some of
the deterrents are initial capital investments in R&D, difficulties in insurance,
bonding, and financing, and most importantly the institutional barriers (EPAs
6 5The above paraphrases Andrew Hoffman's observations, pp. 58-62. A more detailed
explanation of these risks is found in Mr. Hoffman's thesis.
6 6 Porter, Competitive Advantage, p. 182-183.
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standard procedures for remedy selection). Secondly, we must hold-out the
potential for innovators to erect effective entry barriers (thereby enabling
them to sustain their competitive advantage) if and when they find
successful remedies. This can be done by insuring proprietary processes
and know-how developed while sponsored by the government will be
protected in the future.
Ideally, stronger internal rivalry would push industry to seek newer,
better technologies. The government cannot wisely do much to directly
influence the internal rivalry in this industry. Currently, the lack of rivalry is
due more to the "infancy" of the market than to any other factor. The
market is due to heat-up as it matures. Tightening up by government on the
current huge margins (especially in terms of waste and abuse in Superfund)
could do much to stir current competitors to action.
Less is best in terms of buyer power. On the one hand, to say above
that the government should involve itself in the market to court entrants and
stimulate rivalry, and on the other to recommend it quit exerting its muscle
seems contradictory. The fact remains that the current process and
mountain of documentation mandated by law and EPA stifle innovation. In
this case, the customer is choking the producer.
The government can do little to affect either the forces of substitution
or supplier power. In this market, neither will push competitors toward
technological innovation.
I've discussed the reasons for framing the hazardous waste
remediation market as a segment of the construction industry. The
attractiveness of a particular segment is a function of its structural
attractiveness, its size and growth, and the match between a firm's
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capabilities and that segment's needs. 67 Major customers, DOD, DOE, and
EPA all currently propose to "take the lead" in sponsoring innovation--
solving their own cleanup problems and solving the market's problems in the
process. The dispersed responsibility for technology apparent in our Federal
government is unusual among industrialized countries. Most national
governments maintain a ministry of science and technology or a ministry of
trade and industry that has broad responsibility for research and technology-
related activities.6 8 Obviously, the federal government should not continue
to pursue separate disjointed strategies on three fronts--they should
mandate leadership to one of these three principal players. I feel DOD, and
in particular the Corps, is most experienced of the three in working with the
construction industry and is best positioned to take the lead. It's expertise
in the owner-designer-contractor process, contracting, sponsored research
and development, and multi-billion dollar projects set it apart from EPA and
DOE in the context of buyer power in this market. This expertise alters the
impact of the five forces on the DOD-hazardous waste remediation segment
of the industry to favor innovators. The learning curve is less steep for both
producer and buyer in working through the Corps and DOD.
The burden for government is to find, then pursue, strategies which
remedy the unfavorable market forces presented and synthesize the
disjointed recommendations above. Strategy in this case has two elements:
First, weight the effort by giving one agency the power and the resources to
take the lead. Second, commit to a plan which is elementally sound and
671bid., p. 256-257.
6 8 Daniel F. Burton, Jr. and B. R. Inman, "Technology and Competitiveness: The New Policy
Frontier," Foriegn Affairs, (Vol. 69, No. 2, Spring 1990), p. 130.
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executable, sending a clear message to industry that it is in their
competitive and strategic interest to innovate for the government.
3.4 Government and Innovation--Two Potential DOD Strategies
If given the mandate, two reasonable strategies take shape for the
Department of Defense in promoting research and development in the
hazardous waste remediation sector of the construction industry. The two
strategies align roughly with the probable class of technology development
resulting from the strategy--"high tech" and "low tech" remediation
solutions. The high-tech course follows a model presented by DOD
sponsored research and development in the weapons area. The low-tech
course follows an older model for innovation best exemplified by the
construction of our nations federal highways.
3.4.1 A High-tech Model
The probability of success for one of these possible models for
stimulating innovation is tied directly to how that model meshes the
strengths and weaknesses of one party (DOD) to counteract the strengths
and weaknesses of the other (Superfund). The one great obstacle to
success is the amount of cultural change needed by the parties to pursue
the new strategy.
The high-tech model applies the experience the Department of
Defense has in contracting for defense technology to redress many of the
competitive deterrents identified earlier in this paper and to make innovation
strategically attractive to the construction/remediation industry. My
reasoning for proposing this tact follows from this observation. For years,
pursuit of a technological advantage in modern warfare has had three
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positive effects: tremendous technological innovation (particularly in terms
of smart weapons, mechanics of materials, and avionics), an attractive
market for firms doing this innovative work (giving rise to the description
"defense-industrial complex"), and recognized global leadership in terms of
our ability to sell the product, yet not the technology in it, overseas to the
advantage of the firms who produce the technology. The question then
becomes, what lessons from this success can be applied to the remediation
problem? Some of the goals seem quite similar: technological innovation,
making the market attractive for innovators, and global leadership in terms
of exporting the technology.
The key lessons to be applied may be in how we contract. Contracts,
in serving their most elemental purpose, allocate and compensate risk. As
discussed at length in our market analysis, the major barriers to entry for
innovative remediation firms involve risk--risk of future liability, risk of a
shifting standard, risk of forfeiting R&D investments, and difficulty in
financing and bonding because of risk. The attractiveness of pursuing a
strategy roughly modeled on DOD's weapons development and procurement
is that it can mend some of the above risk issues for the contractor. In
simple terms, the model pays/compensates the contractor for his risk. In its
most base form, DOD determined the broad set of goal specifications for the
product it wanted. The specifications, by definition, were high and in many
cases the requisite technology may yet be feasible or conceived. The risk
remained with the competing firms in funding and developing the
prototypes/proposals for consideration. DOD and Congress then awarded
the contract to the most promising prototype (politics and pork-barreling
aside) and began subsidizing the contractor's risk--usually in a cost-plus
arrangement whereby the innovator is reimbursed for their value added--in
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production of the "one-off." Future contracts are awarded to the defense
contractor based upon the success of the one-off. Should it be applied to
DOD's mission of cleaning-up the mess?
The model would also redress some of the market unattractiveness
identified by our Porter analysis. By reducing risk, barriers to entry for firms
pursuing a strategy of developing new remediation technologies would be
effectively lowered. New contracting philosophies which compensate
contractors for their risks would begin to correct an industry perception
which claims there is no profit in working for the government. As
mentioned earlier, willingness to allow firms to protect their breakthroughs
rather than lose them to DOD, would only lend to the attractiveness of this
market segment. This is not a lesson/technique taken from the weapons
development model but may be the linchpin in drawing competitors into the
market. Lastly, much like the current defense industrial complex, increased
market attractiveness would drive up the internal rivalry within the industry,
whereby innovating is a legitimate means of gaining a competitive
advantage.
Wise adoption of the model may call for a more efficient use of the
Corps' R&D funds and a new mandate to their laboratories. Instead of
devoting time, personnel, and money to developing their own remediation
technologies, the Corps may be better and more efficiently served by using
their expertise in setting remediation standards and verifying contracted
remediation work and contractors' claims--as quality control and quality
assurance in this still ill-defined process. The key is not to rely on the Corps
traditional weakness in exporting its innovations to private industry, but in
its strengths in project management, quality control, and contracting.
The Corps' contracting expertise now actually deters firms from
working for them--the contracts are too tight, the margins are too small, and
they aren't necessarily compensated for their risks. The model recognizes
the anomaly of bid contracting. Fair contracts properly compensate the
parties for their risks in the project or work. The aberration in this
philosophy is the fixed-bid contract--where the contractor takes all the risk
yet gets minimally compensated. The Corps has been able to make this
work for their construction contracts for a number of reasons: the relatively
low-tech nature of the work; the Corps' involvement in the design,
management, and quality control of the projects, and; the market forces
which compel firms to bid for the work, even given the narrow profit
margins. The challenges and the risks presented for the remediation
contractor, particularly the innovator, make working for the DOD
unattractive under current contracting conditions. The Corps has problems
courting some of the best firms to do innovative work for DOD because of
their contracting record. Some large firms feel there's little money to be
made working for the Corps. 69 There are a number of reasons for this
perception: most of the contracts are fixed-bid and go to the lowest
qualified bidder; owner involvement in quality control and quality assurance;
years of experience and research have developed "tight" contracts and,
most significantly; a lengthy and expensive processes and outcomes in
resolving contract disputes. All add up to small margins for firms doing
work for the federal government. The best case for the new contracting
6 9 0bservation based upon questions to representives of numerous companies in the
construction industry at The Global Environment and the Construction Industry Symposium
held at M.I.T. 21-22 October 1991.
philosophy may be in the eroding of value delivered by the traditional low-
bid model 70.
The downside of changing the way the Corps contracts for services is
that it is counter to the existing contracting culture within this arm of DOD.
The acquisition arms of the different services in the Department of Defense
have traditionally operated under a different governing philosophy than the
Corps. Their philosophy is driven primarily by the end product, the
performance, the technology--not necessarily the cost. The heuristic
parallels the goals of the program, where the premium is on innovation and
making it attractive to the market. Contrast this with the traditional
contracting model for the design and delivery of construction where the
value is not in the technology but in the cost. Construction has been
admittedly "low-tech" in the past, particularly in comparison to smart bombs
and stealth fighters. The heuristic in this case has borne a culture which
rewards and admires inexpensive yet inelegant solutions to technological
problems. While policies and governing regulations and procedures are
changed with the stroke of a pen, organizational cultures evolve over time.
This may be the greatest obstacle in adapting the weapons development
model to the remediation problem.
3.4.2 A Low-tech Model
A second, less abrasive approach to spurring innovation is based
upon the construction of our federal highways early this century. The
heuristic for this model requires both the government to provide for (and
7 0 A thorough analysis of contracting types and value delivered is presented in Christopher
Gordon, Compatibility of Construction Contracting Methods with Projects and Owners
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: a thesis submitted to the Department of Civil Engineering,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September 1991).
73
industry to recognize) a stable future market. The burden is then on
government to set high, yet achievable standards for industry competitors.
The traditional bidding process then drives competitors in the market to
finding technological advances which meet the established standards and
increase their margins and therefore their competitive advantage. In this
model, two of the three pieces are mostly in place--the market and the
bidding process.
As shown earlier in this paper, federal legislation and DOD reaction
has made a strong case in fulfilling the first precursor--creating a stable
market. In fact, the Department of Defense's market may indeed be more
stable than either private or other federal clean-up markets into the next
century. My reasoning is that DOD budgets and funding are not tied to the
Superfund and its anticipated gut-wrenching reauthorization. The instability
in this particular market's future is more tied to the litany of risks and
uncertainties outlined in our discussion of Superfund's frailties than to
DOD's fiscal commitment to cleaning-up their mess. If under this strategy,
DOD were to contract in such a manner as to ensure firms proprietary rights
for the technologies they develop working for the Corps, the market would
encompass even larger borders. Firms would find assurance and stability in
knowing they could export their competitive advantage to other markets.
The work ahead for government is in setting high, definable, yet
attainable standards for their cleanups. This is no easy task. Risk and risk
assessment are at the root of Superfund's problems. While the Corps has
some leverage by virtue of the courts, any stable standard setting would
have to be reached through a concentual process involving EPA (an perhaps
environmental advocacy groups and congress). Defining acceptable risk has
proven to be more political than technical. DOD and the Corps may not be
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adept at massaging the political-decision making piece of the problem. They
can, however, lend their considerable resources and expertise to the
technical aspect.
As the nation's largest owner and buyer of construction, the military
has always been concerned with construction research and technology.
Currently, there are six major military laboratories devoted to construction
R&D--four in the Army, and one each in the Navy and Air Force. These labs
spend approximately $250 million per year on construction-related research.
As a percentage of construction investment, the investment the Corps
makes in construction research is roughly 100 times greater than the
industry average.7 1 One of the most significant and far reaching aspects of
DOD's construction R&D program are two $15 million grants made in the
mid 1980's--one to MIT, and the other to the University of Illinois--to
conduct basic research in advanced construction technology. These are the
largest grants for basic construction research ever seen in the US. 72
While these labs have contributed immeasurably to the readiness and
functionality of the military, over the years, they have traditionally found
difficulty in exporting their innovations to the market. As a means of
helping the given problem, this detractor could mesh a DOD strength
(technological expertise) with a national need. By redirecting some R&D at
its existing laboratories to the mission of standard setting and certifying the
viability of remediation innovations--rather than towards developing and
selling military innovations--the Corps could contribute to not only cleaning-
up its mess, but some of the rest of the mess.
7 1 Note that although DOD's construction R&D program represents less than one percent of
the total military R&D budget, it would be large enough to rank in the top one-hundred R&D
programs in corporate America.
7 2 Martin, pp. 133-134.
The major effect of this effort would be to "still the moving target"
for industry. Clear, definable, attainable standards and specifications limit
the ambiguity in contracted performance. This plays to another institutional
strength of the Corps--quality control and quality assurance. Measurable
specifications minimize contract and performance disputes. This is the
language the government and the industry understand and have comfort in
executing. The Corps could then use in expertise and credibility to "certify"
to the viability of new technologies. The most likely trickle-down benefit
from the reduced riskiness is lower insurance and bonding costs for
remediators and more entrants to the market.
The third component of this model is to rely on the competitiveness
of the stable and defined market, driving rivals to innovate in order to
improve their margins and bidding strength. The government's role in this
activity is already defined. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
dictates the competitive nature of bidding and contracting with the federal
government. Continuing with a Porter-like analysis, the internal rivalry
within the attractive market will cause competitors to innovate incrementally
to increase their competitive advantage. Innovations in both product and
process lower costs to the firm throughout the value chain, thereby
increasing their margins (profits). In the traditional nature of the
construction industry, innovation improves a firm's ability to bid versus its
competitors.
Innovation in construction has traditionally been incremental. In
Harvard Business Review, Ralph Gomory makes a clear distinction between
major new innovations and a less dramatic process of innovation that he
believes to be far more critical to commercializing technology profitably. He
calls this process "cyclic development" whose hallmark is incremental
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improvement not breakthrough. 73 Both government and industry need to be
willing to invest the time and money necessary to make incremental
improvements in the remediation technology business.
The attractiveness of this model versus the high-tech model proposed
earlier, is that it doesn't try to change the culture of either the government
(in this case, the Corps) or the construction industry. There is a certain
comfort in "business as usual." Additionally, as the U. S. is now finding in
its pursuit of the HDTV market after abandoning the perceived low-tech
television market several years ago: there is a tremendous amount of
technology transfer from traditionally low-tech industries and processes to
emerging high-tech markets. The unattractiveness in this model is that
invites only incremental risk-taking by competitors. Additionally, because of
the traditionally narrow margins and lengthy dispute process over claims,
many major players may continue to shun federal work under low bid
conditions.
Particular to the argument for a "low-tech" strategy is the need to
imperative to set standards for the market. Well conceived and thorough
specifications limit liability and invite innovation. Where to set this standard
and for which sites is particularly important in developing a strategy. One
tact may be to set a very high standard from the start on all sites and hope
for industry to reach for it by innovating. This can easily have the
undesirable effect of increasing the risks for the innovative firms. Another
course is to set reasonably high standards and thorough specifications on a
majority of sites which would have the effect of inviting firms to compete in
producing a relatively known "product." While the past ten years have
7 3 Ralph E. Gomory, "From the 'Ladder of Science' to the Product Development Cycle"
Harvard Business Review, November-December 1989.
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pragmatically shown this to be more of a policy choice than a solution
based upon technical merit, the increasing costs and continued uncertainty
call for at least consideration of a "less than pristine" solution for some of
our sites.
3.5 "Pristine" versus Safe
Any responsible academic discussion of the hazardous waste problem
must turn at some point to the balance between cost and risk. A necessary
precondition to analysis is to divorce from the discussion the political (or
emotional, non-technical) input to the decision making process presented
earlier in this study. The importance of this sterile analysis to DOD's
problem is that DOD may have the best justification for and the best means
of pursuing this ideal-world solution. No other entity has as many or as
varied sites to be remediated. Additionally, unlike private industry or other
federal agencies, DOD will perpetually "own" the majority of their sites and
can exercise active control over future exposure to risk--allowing it to defer
"pristine" in favor of "safe" until technology and market forces make
pristine affordable.
Man traumatizes nature in pursuit of modernization and
industrialization. The earth and nature have a unique ability to heal these
injuries over time by photolysis, hydrolysis, biodegradation, and
oxidation/reduction processes. When the rate of injury outpaces the
environment's ability to absorb the trauma and mend itself, pollution
problems become acute. One factor I find neglected in defining risk and in
risk assessments is this ability for the earth to heal. In the case-by-case
business of site investigation and remediation selection, this may seem
justified. In the macro-sense, when looking at the prospect of cleaning-up
thousands of sites of various complexities, distributed in varying proximities
to mankind, perhaps the surgery we perform on some injuries should bring
the patient back the point where it can heal over time without imposing a
risk to man. Why treat every site the same? In a society with unlimited
resources, a pervasive moral argument for pristine wins. In a society of
competing interests for limited resources (right now, federal and private
funds), a pragmatic, dispassionate argument for safe should carry more
weight. The crux of the problem is that in this society the moral argument
is applied to a problem of competing interests and limited resources.
In examining the pragmatic argument presented, two tacts take
shape--the costs of adding 9's and the costs of indecision. The first
observation/analysis is based upon a composite of the myriad of resources
available bemoaning the high costs of investigations and cleanups. The
second applies personal lessons and observations in crisis decision making.
The costs of adding 9's74 rise exponentially in remediating a
hazardous waste site. Costs are two-fold: time and money. Differing sites,
various contractors and remediation technologies, and shifting standards
make attaching number's to the phenomenon prohibitive. Qualitatively, the
changing effect on cleanup costs can best be explained graphically. Figure
3.9 represents the costs in terms of time and money.
7 4Adding 9's refers to the cleanliness of the site. For example, six 9's refers to a site being
99.999999% clean, or 1 part contaminant per million. Nine 9's refers to a site cleaned to 1
part per billion.
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Exponential Increases in Cost for "Adding 9's"
$ C
$
Figure 3.9
The problem lies in defining safe in terms of concentration (C)--just
what is the risk to human health. What does one chance in one-million of
developing a chronic illness mean? How does it compare to more common
health risks like passive smoke inhalation, commercial flight, or alcohol
consumption? The pragmatic question to me is, what are we responsibly
willing to pay to lower the risk posed by a cleanup. Is it worth spending six
or ten times the money to minimally reduce the risk of a site--from say one
one-hundredth the risk of a normal person in a common living and working
environment falling ill from passive smoke inhalation to one two-hundredth
that same risk? If this were an apolitical problem, that elusive point where
costs "intersect" benefits would show us where and how to spend.
Because DOD will maintain ownership of the majority of its sites perpetually,
and can control development or human access, a strong case can be made
for DOD to clean all of their sites to safe, and some of their sites to pristine,
and allow the earth or technological improvements to heal the remaining
trauma over time.
The second anomaly in the process relates to the opportunities lost to
untimeliness. What additional needless risk do we incur because of
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indecision? The best example we can give is from the hard-learned lessons
of crisis or disaster management. In almost every case, a simple, feasible
plan--maybe only the 90% solution--acted upon immediately and executed
vigorously conspicuously outperforms the complicated, 100% solution,
developed over time and only then, acted upon. The decision-maker simply
becomes overcome by events. The distinction between the two tacts is
that in the former the emphasis in terms of time available and resources is
given to physically fixing the problem. In the latter, the time available and
resources go toward finding the perfect solution--while the problem persists
or worsens. Figure 3.10 graphically represents this dynamic.
Decision-Time-Risk Relationships
C
Figure 3.10
What are the costs in terms of additional exposure to the
contaminants or opportunities for use of the site lost to finding the 100%
solution? What are the gains in adding 9's if it takes five times as long to
execute? In the above figure, the shaded area under the curve shows the
additional exposure/risk incurred while deliberating over the pristine solution.
The first figure showing the current situation, the second graphically
depicting the effect of action. This shows the lost opportunities at just one
site. Lengthy ROD's (the Record of Decision specifying the remediation
technique for a site) also deny timely action on subsequent sites. Crisis
management is a strength of DOD and treating the problem as a crisis
meshes well with this part of DOD's culture. As discussed earlier, the
concept of operable units attempts to compress the space and time for the
cleanup.
If it were politically free to pursue this rationalist strategy for cleaning
up the mess, the Department of Defense could make a strong case for
expeditiously taking care of business. While morally distasteful to some
parties, a pragmatic argument could be made in favor of vigorous pursuit of
remediating to safe.
What adds to the persuasiveness of this argument is that DOD can
pursue this rationalist strategy on select sites--those which it will not turn
over; those which pose no long term threat to human safety because of
access, and; those in which the contaminant is such that the earth can heal
the remaining damage over a relatively short period of time. Additionally, as
either funds continue to be allocated by Congress or as better, cheaper
technological solutions arise, the DOD can hold out the promise or
guarantee of cleaning these select sites to pristine.
The weakness in this argument is in the track record of pragmatists in
the existing process. The political realities of getting a ROD from the EPA
have progressively pushed the 9's higher in the ten year life of the
legislation.
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4. RECOMMENDA TIONS
Finding a Win-Win Solution
After researching and analyzing the players and the problem, the task
becomes inventing workable, reasonable solutions or strategies. Optimal
strategies create a "win-win" solution for the players. The purpose
becomes meshing the strengths and weaknesses of DOD and the strengths
and weaknesses of RECRA to produce innovative technologies to clean-up
the mess.
Thus far, this paper has discussed the Hazardous Waste Remediation
Industry, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of
Defense--the players. It has analyzed the strengths and weakness of both
Superfund and the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. We've then
analyzed the interaction of these players and the problem in the context of
the market--in this case, the construction industry--using an industry
segmentation matrix and Porter's five competitive forces. Lastly, we've
discussed recent examples of government involvement in stimulating
technological innovation in other industries and proposed two quite different
models for sponsoring innovation.
Our recommendations should be realistic--we shouldn't expect to
rewrite or undo CERCLA, but work within the existing framework. They
should prove beneficial to each of the players at the expense of none. Most
importantly, the recommendations should expedite cleaning-up the mess.
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Ten years of military service have shown that the view is always
different from the inside. I can say with certainty that there are competent,
dedicated and influential people within DOD that are working to improve the
system.
Given either model presented, the Corps of Engineers, in executing
the cleanup of our military hazardous waste sites, presents the best
opportunity for the construction industry to both enter the market and seek
innovative cleanup technologies. The burden now is on the Corps (or
Congress, by directing the Corps) to take the baton, and for the
construction industry to see the opportunity. To be the leader, the Corps
must present a viable and stable market, subsidize or underwrite the risks of
innovation, and protect competitors who break-through. First, DOD and the
Corps have some in-house work ahead.
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4.1 Vision
While the Defense Environmental Restoration Program and the Army
go to great lengths to comply with all EPA, state, and local regulations,
none have clear leverage against the Department of Defense through the
courts. This should not be a problem unless both have valid competing
interests concerning the federal lands. In these cases, I think it is important
to not lose sight of the goal: to clean up the mess. This does not mean
that there is a double standard--just an ill-defined one. Given the goal and
this unavoidable relationship, the Corps of Engineers is presented with a
mandate for action. They have a real opportunity to do what Superfund can
not do--they can actually clean up the mess. With this opportunity comes
expectation and a responsibility for both action and vision.
The opportunity calls for vision beyond a decentralized plan, where
individual installations select remedies for their individual sites. Much of the
process can and should be initiated and executed locally. However, with
the Department of Defense recently adding approximately 3,000 new sites
in its latest annual report to Congress (making the total number of identified
sites number over 17,000)75 the Corps has the opportunity to exercise
vision and become an incubator for both technology 7 6 and process.
7 5
"Newscall," ARMY (Arlington, Virginia: Association of the United States Army, May
1991) p. 64.
7 6 Alex Dornstauder, Hazardous Waste Remediation and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers: Facilitating Technological Innovation Through Construction Management
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: a thesis submitted to Department of Civil Engineering,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May 1991).
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4.2 Tightening-up In-House
A natural fall-out of conducting research to write this paper is a new-
found familiarity with DERP and the Army's Installation Restoration Program,
in particular. The following recommendations for improvement within the
Army and its system for cleaning-up the mess serve two purposes. First, I
have a personal interest as a professional officer in helping the Army to
most effectively reach its goals--militarily or environmentally. Additionally,
as is, DOD's current system may be the best chance for actually getting any
site cleaned-up.77 As discussed earlier, problems with procedure, confusion
about standards, and litigation risks slow the remediation process under EPA
(Superfund--the money and the NPL) and DOE to a crawl or even a
standstill. Improving the actual set-up, philosophy, and DOD remediation
process will make it an even more inviting market segment for the
construction and remediation industry to enter and especially to innovate.
Lessons learned could help other agencies and the private sector clean-up
their mess.
4.2.1 Central Database
One of the great strengths of both the military construction system
and the U.S. construction industry is their decentralized system of both
7 7 Maureen Ann McCabe, An Introduction to the Defense Environmental Restoration
Program (Washington D.C.: a thesis submitted to the National Law Center, George
Washington University, September 1990), pp. 39-40. Ms. McCabe forwards one little
known difference between DERP and other Superfund cleanups that might make liability less
an issue in DOD cleanups. The provisions of section 119 of CERCLA apply to contractors
who carry out response actions under DERP. In it, the contractor in not liable for injuries,
costs, damages, expenses, or other liability resulting from the release or threatened release
of a hazardous substance unless the response contractor causes a release and his action
was negligent, was grossly negligent, or constituted intentional misconduct. In certain
instances, the President may agree to indemnify a contractor even where his action was
negligent.
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responsibility and authority. This system has traditionally allowed Corps
personnel in the field the freedom and flexibility to do their jobs and execute
their missions without being confined by micro-management from
headquarters. 7 8 A graphic representation of DOD's current construction
delivery system is presented in Figure 4.1.
Military Construction Delivery System 7 9
*During wartime, divisions and districts within a unified command's theatre of operations,
will fall under that theatre command.
Direct command authority
- - - - - - - - Technical advice and support
Figure 4.1
Unfortunately, many of the advantages that make decentralization
work in managing over $10 billion of construction a year, work against
finding innovative solutions to remediation problems. Coordinating the vast
resources available, both in terms of money and manpower, cannot happen
if individual contracting officers at individual installations have the primary
7 8 Martin, p. 117.
7 9 1bid., p.80.
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part to play in selection of individual remedies. This one step in the
process, selection and contracting of remediation techniques should be
influenced "centrally" for a number of reasons. First, each site should be a
part of a larger plan for the total cleanup. Its remediation should contribute
purposefully to increase our knowledge about a technique, process, or
technology--adding to the empirical database by design rather than by
coincidence. No single PRP has responsibility for the cleanup of as many or
as many varied sites as the Department of Defense. In this area, lessons
should only be learned once. The costs of inefficiency are unnecessary and,
as Superfund has shown, too high.
This paper does not propose the Corps change its construction
delivery system. Their decentralized system continues to be the best one
for traditional construction services. Hazardous waste remediation,
however, is a new problem. The changing dynamics of the industry, the
incrementally evolving technologies, and the high cost of mistakes, call for
changes in attacking this particular problem. The inability of the
construction industry as a whole to take advantage of the information
revolution may plague the Corps in how they approach remediation. Who
actually has the lead for the Corps in the cleanup, and where are they? The
O aha District was a center of expertise for cleanups. USATHAMA in
Aberdeen is the proponent for the Installation Restoration Program.
Huntsville is the expert agency for explosive cleanups...Almost everyone
has there fingers in some part of the pie.
What is necessary is a lead office for the big picture. This office
should create and maintain a database of the collective experience of the
Corps (and especially the industry) in cleaning up its mess--perhaps much
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like DOE's WIN system80 for installation waste minimization. They've
already had numerous cleanups and sites across the country, have either
experimented or sponsored experimentation on numerous technologies, and
are in the process of contracting for new cleanups. Some agency should
know or have available what works, what might work, and what didn't
work so mistakes will not be made twice and technological "leads" can be
followed-up. This office or agency presents industry with a viable target to
propose innovative solutions. As discussed earlier, one of the biggest
deterrents to entrants is the bureaucratic maze.
Improvements are in progress. The Corps was DOD's lead agency in
producing their Five Year Integrated Hazardous Material/Hazardous Waste
Management Plan. In this plan, the Corps identified a single centralized
Army HM/HW Technology Transfer Manager (and Office) be created and
empowered to centrally coordinate technology transfer for HM/HW
initiatives now being developed independently by the many Army and DOD
facilities. They've additionally created a technology implementation
"Support Center" to be the point of contact for solutions to problems that
arise when technologies are implemented and especially as the center for
technology exchange between other Services and the private sector. 8 1
Currently USATHAMA publishes literature documenting ongoing
remediation R&D either conducted by the Corps in one of its four
laboratories or sponsored by the Corps on site. In Installation Restoration
and Hazardous Waste Control Technologies the Corps purpose is outlined as
8 0 Hazardous Waste Remedial Actions Program (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Tennessee:
HAZWRAP Support Contract Office, August 1990), p. 8-10.
81 Five Year Integrated Hazardous Material/Hazardous Waste Management Plan, U.S. Army
Construction Engineering Research Laboratory (Champaign, Illinois, September, 1990), pp.
16-18.
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providing a convenient reference of current installation restoration and
hazardous waste control technologies. The detail provided in each
technology summary is intended to explain the capabilities and limitations to
the reader and to provide a point-of-contact for additional technical
information. 82 By presenting this information to users as well as other
developers, U.S. Army Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency Pollution
Abatement and Installation Restoration Research and Development Program
Activities FY 90 hopes to avoid duplication of effort by other R&D agencies
with similar responsibilities and missions, and timely technology transfer can
occur so that other developers may build upon the research results already
obtained.83
4.2.2 Streamline, Systemize, and Execute Vigorously
The following fine-tuning in the Army's Installation Restoration
Program could make DOD cleanups more attractive to industry, particularly
if they help the Corps to build a track record of success. Given the
lethargic, risk-averse history of Superfund cleanups--with the mountain of
documentation, liability issues, and special interest group impact--the ability
to work through the Corps could be the fastest way to incremental
advances in remediation techniques for a firm.
8 2/nstallation Restoration and Hazardous Waste Control Technologies, U.S. Army Toxic and
Hazardous Materials Agency (Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland: Government Printing
Office, August 1990), p. 1.
8 3 U.S. Army Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency Pollution Abatement and Installation
Restoration Research and Development Program Activities FY 90, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency (Washington D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1990), p. 1.
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4.2.2.1 The "Negotiated" Baseline Assessment
The public has a critical role in the decision-making and review
processes associated with environmental restoration. The legal and
political issues surrounding hazardous waste, which are driven by
public opinion, have had more impact in setting the direction of
cleanup programs than have the technical issues associated with site
cleanup. In the future, the public is likely to demand even greater
input into the decision-making process as special interest groups
become more savvy in their dealings with DOE and EPA, and
concerns about waste issues continue to grow. 84
Strategies for Environmental Restoration
In An Evolving Regulatory Environment
One way the Army and the Corps of Engineers can avoid the "decide-
announce-defend" syndrome is to involve the interested parties earlier in the
process--particularly in the Installation Restoration Program. A supplemental
publication called the Commander's Guide to Public Involvement in the
Army's Installation Restoration Program is an honest attempt to make the
public a part of the process. The existing system should work for non-
controversial sites and the Corps should be able to make strides in cleanups,
working-off the lower-end or "easy" problems. The more challenging sites--
the tough ones--will require greater effort from the command and the Army
in terms of trying to address the interests of all the key players: EPA, state,
citizen groups, and not least of all the military.
The Guide to Public Involvement makes a clear distinction between
public relations and public participation, describing the first to be "a planned
effort to influence opinion through socially responsible performance"85 and
advocating the second as "a planned effort to involve citizen's in the
8 4 Geffen and Keller, pp. 9-10.
8 5 Commander's Guide to Public Involvement in the Army's Installation Restoration Program,
U.S. Army Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency (Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland:
Government Printing Office, November 1990), p.7.
decision-making process." 86 Public Affairs Officers are formally schooled in
balancing these two concepts and the guidance recommends the
commander use his PAO and staff to prepare and manage public
involvement in the process. The issue for the command becomes which of
the two--public relations or public participation--is actually pursued when the
stakes are high. The Army should act against its natural tendencies to
ensure that, as an identified problem becomes less defined and more
complex, it tips the scales toward public participation and away from public
relations. To the greatest extent possible, in these cases where controversy
can be anticipated, work to get the stakeholders to set the baseline risk.
The military often has strong ties to the surrounding civilian
communities--witness the recent uproar over proposed base closures. A
heavy proportion of the adjacent communities either are employed by the
military, are military and their dependants, or are economically dependent
upon the soldiers and their families for business. Historically, the
relationship has not necessarily been adversarial and the stakeholders have
worked through problems in the past like noise abatement and land use. A
viable inroad exists for public participation in defining that elusive point
where costs and benefits balance.
A baseline risk assessment in which all the stakeholders can accept--
whether through negotiation for hard sites or public announcement and
comment for relatively easier ones--is the one area that public participation
can most effect a defense site cleanup. As Robert Harris and Grover Wrenn
summarize about the Superfund experience, "If given equal access to
technical resources and allowed to participate in the planning process, the
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8 6 1bid.
public is likely to develop a greater appreciation of the complexity of
hazardous waste problems and to be more accepting of on-site remedies." 87
This works with and not against the military work ethic which can be
paraphrased as, "tell me what standard is expected and when I have to
achieve it, but not how to do it!"--task, condition, standard again. For this
cultural reason, negotiated solutions later in the process such as remedy
selection or contracting, hold less potential for a successful cleanup within
DERP.
4.2.2.2 Unearth the Remedial Project Manager
One potential weakness in the Army's Installation Restoration
Program and the system for action it outlines is in the relative importance of
the installation's Remedial Project Manager (RPM). This individual is usually
the installation's environmental coordinator and commonly be found working
for the Directorate of Engineering and Housing (DEH). In the Army
hierarchy, this means that the RPM is not someone who would necessarily
"have the bosses ear." More often than not, the RPM would not be a prime
player in the day-to-day mission of the installation unless a cleanup, or
public pressure, or some other factor he controlled impacted upon that
installation mission. The guidance is not written to lessen or diminish the
importance of this player, but his place in the hierarchy places him in a
reactive position--one who's importance becomes apparent only in crisis--
rather than in a place where he can anticipate and garner command
emphasis and resources. Much like the market, hazardous waste has
traditionally been an externality, or the cost of doing business for old-school
commanders and, until the hard lesson is learned, the IRP may just be
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8 7 Harris and Wrenn, p. 58.
another one of the many responsibilities he has that he trusts a subordinate
to execute.
The Remedial Project Manager is the action man in the program. He
is the individual responsible for implementing the program and ultimately
cleaning-up the site. If cleanup is indeed an Army priority, we should move
him to a position in the hierarchy where he can better effect command
attention and action.
The Air Force has seen this problem and has adjusted its system for
installation cleanup. The following excerpt details this incremental
improvement in their program and their willingness to give the installation
the visibility necessary to accomplish the mission.
The solution to the needs of access and authority is the
establishment of a single Environmental Management Office (EMO)
comprising all the key experts who report directly to the installation
commander. The Air Force's first EMO was organized in 1985 at
McClellan AFB, CA, as a local initiative to provide a unified body to
respond to mounting regulatory, media, and public interest in
hazardous waste contamination at the installation...AII bases with
EMOs support the concept. They cite vastly improved
communications from the environmental experts to the installation
commander (access), an ability to compel base organizations to
change procedures to achieve compliance (authority), and a greatly
enhanced, even synergistic, responsiveness to environmental
problems by combining various disciplines into one organization...
I recommend these organizational guidelines:
* The Environmental Management Office be comprised of the
current functions of the Environmental Co-ordinator and the
Bioenvironmental Engineer and be staffed with funded positions that
reflect the number and scope of environmental issues at the
installation.
* The Chief of Environmental Management report directly to
the installation commander.
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* The Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) assign one judge advocate
to give priority to responding to requests for staff assistance by the
Chief EMO. 88
One possible reason the Air Force was able to lend a fresh
perspective to the problem is their unique engineering structure. In the
Army, the Corps of Engineers both staffs the installation DEH and the
regional contracting offices which manage the cleanup. The Corps of
Engineers does not run the installation DEHs for the Air Force, yet maintains
responsibility for contracting cleanups and military construction. Their
ability to look at the system from the "outside" lent them insight in this
case.
4.2.2.3 Hanscom A.F.B.: Case Study in Possibilities
I've included the following short case to emphasize the possibilities
for industry, the Corps, and DOD if they can find and institutionalize process
improvements in their program. The key as that the players do not lose
sight of the overall goal--to clean up the mess and move on.
From 1952 to 1974, the U.S. Air Force leased and operated the
Hanscom Air Field in Bedford, Mass. During that time, the Air Force
had generated various spent fuels, paint thinners, solvents, solid
wastes and other combustible liquids and disposed of some on-site.
In 1985, an Air Force investigation revealed the effects of the past
disposal practices: Four waste sites were found within the 100 acre
confines of the air field.
The relative speed with which the cleanup progressed from
feasibility study to contract awards was possible through the
Installation Restoration Program (IRP), the military version of EPA's
Superfund Program...While civilian cleanup programs can drag on for
years as "potentially responsible parties" are identified to share costs,
military cleanups can move along more quickly because of IRP. At
8 8 Major Richard A. Phelps, USAF, "Environmental Management Offices--Key to the Air
Force's Future Viability," The Military Engineer(Alexandria, Virginia: The Society of American
Military Engineers, July 1991), p. 46.
Hanscom, IRP provided the military with a shortcut around the
cumbersome and time-consuming cost recovery procedures required
at Superfund sites...Because there was sufficient information available
from previous studies at Hanscom to document the presence of
contamination, the Air Force undertook phases 2 and 4 (of the IRP
process) concurrently.
As the studies were undertaken, the Air Force held regularly
scheduled meetings with official parties interested in the results.
These parties included the property owner--the Massachusetts Port
Authority (Massport)--the town of Bedford, the DEQE, EPA and the
Corps of Engineers. As a result, draft reports were formulated as a
consensus of opinion and required only minor changes to comply with
the requirements of all parties.89
4.3 Message to Industry
Government has a tremendous impact on how firms compete in the
market. Government has a particular interest in the remediation market
because it is a market born from legislation. The in-house recommendations
made above addressed identified problems in the way the Department of
Defense cleans-up its hazardous waste. The remaining recommendations
take-on broader issues and speak more towards seizing opportunities than
fixing problems.
Shifts in social attitudes and norms can have an impact on
industries...but the governmental influences on industries that result
from them usually have the most significant and tangible impact on
industry structure...There is usually some lead time in the introduction
of government regulatory changes. The firm must constantly monitor
trends in governmental influence on the industry, and analyze the
structural impact of the range of possible government options under
consideration. It is then in a position to attempt to influence
regulation ... and to prepare strategically for the regulatory changes
that are a real possibility.90
Michael Porter
8 9 Wesley E. Stimpson, "Fast Tracking Military Waste." Civil Engineering (New York, New
York: American Society of Civil Engineers, Vol. 59, No. 4, April 1989) pp. 36-37.
9 0 Michael E. Porter, Note on Industry Structural Change (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard
Business School, No. 9-377-051, 1976), p. 11-12.
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First, Congress or the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense
should mandate the Corps "go on record" as having a policy of sponsoring
innovation and new technology in industry, DOD laboratories, and
universities for cleaning-up its old waste. This new mandate would send a
powerful signal to industry that a stable, sustainable market underwritten by
a credible "buyer" favors technological risk.
4.3.1 Wrest Control of the Disjointed Situation
Currently, three players are aggressively working towards becoming
the leader in Federal government's cleanup program. The EPA, with its
traditional ties to CERCLA and SARA, feel they are best suited to continue
the process when more and more of the sites on the NPL move through the
pipeline from investigation to actual remediation. I feel strongly that
inexperience in construction-like contracts and relationships combined with
relative inexperience in large scale R&D programs make the learning curve
too steep for them for them to be an effective leader. Additionally, the
integrity of the impartiality EPA lends to the remediation contracts and
technologies they sponsor may present a conflict of interests given their role
as the regulatory agency.
DOE has a tremendous stake in the process. While the number of
sites they own are few, they are some of the most complex and expensive
sites on the NPL. Their case for a leadership role is stronger than EPA's,
but for reasons outlined throughout this paper, not as strong as DOD's. The
following is excerpted from DOE's Five Year Plan, 1992-1995:
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The DOE plan to restore and properly operate its sites should
be the national testbed for environmental restoration and waste
management technology development and implementation. A fully
successful Technology Development Program constituting about 10
percent of the Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste
Management's budget will result in DOE not only achieving its goal,
but achieving it faster, more safely, and at lower cost. Even if only
partially successful, technology development will provide significant
benefits. Technology transfer to industry, including the development
of a cadre of DOE technical specialists, will support and expedite
national efforts in restoration. The investment in technology
development will be more than repaid by savings in operational costs.
The absence of a Technology Development Program will result in a
continuation of the old practices of "suck, muck, and truck." The
result will be exorbitant costs, probable delays, and unnecessary
exposure of workers and the public to chemical and radiological
hazards.
DOE recognizes that OTD must expect to have a high rate of
failure. Technological breakthroughs cannot be planned or depended
upon. Progress will instead largely be made as the result of a series
of incremental advancements...
Remediation technologies are available for many applications
but have rarely been completely tested and evaluated for uses in
specific DOE situations. Testing and evaluation of promising existing
technologies for mixed wastes and contaminated sites will provide
environmental restoration technologists with an arsenal of available
methods with known costs and effectiveness. 9 1
DOE can and should actively pursue technological innovations. The
case here though is for a lead agency. While competition may drive the
marketplace towards innovative solutions, it can be wasteful and overly
expensive for the taxpayer if federal agencies compete for R&D resources
and capital. DOD is better suited to be the lead agency for technological
improvements in remediation. Many of the issues raised earlier in this
paper--a history of sponsoring R&D, experience with industry and
contracting for services and technology, the physical aspects of managing
9 1 Environmental Restoration and Waste Management: Five Year Plan, Fiscal Years 1992-
1996 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, June 1990), pp. 30-31.
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cleanups--cannot be learned or bought by the DOE. I also strongly believe
that innovation will most likely be incremental, especially in the next five to
ten years. With their limited number of sites, all of which are among the
most complex on the NPL, DOE may not have the luxury of learning to crawl
before they can walk and run.
This current situation is a microcosm of the fragmented, inconsistent
legislation and current procedure for cleaning up. Government should halt
the dysfunctional, unspoken competition among these heavyweights and pin
the rose on the player best able to sponsor, direct, and manage an efficient,
unified program for finding the best means and technologies for cleaning up
the mess. I think DOD is that agency.
4.3.2 Education, R&D Sponsorship
Government programs have always contributed importantly to the
education of scientists and engineers, provided equipment and facilities, and
encouraged the basic research that industry utilizes in its efforts to
commercialize technology. Sustained investments in these areas are critical
to our nation's economic future. 92
The Corps will continue to be a leader in construction technology
research. Hazardous waste remediation is the next big frontier for the
construction industry and the time may be now for the Corps to shift focus
and resources to this new element of construction. Funded and directed
university research to augment that remediation research conducted in its
labs and research that it sponsors in industry, would benefit both the
military, the industry, and most importantly society. One of the lessons the
9 2 Burton Inman, "Technology and Competitiveness: The New Policy Frontier," pp. 131-
132.
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Corps may take from its past, combined with the opportunities presented by
advances in information technology, may be to ensure their research effort
is efficient. As discussed earlier, a more efficient use of its labs and
expertise may be to use each to certify potential technologies proposed by
industry. They can be the catalyst in the two proposed models for
innovation. The same problems with decentralization addressed above can
equally apply in how the Corps spends its research dollars. Perhaps the labs
or the office recommended above could help to ensure sponsored
researchers at MIT, Illinois, or Berkeley are not making the same mistakes,
looking at exactly the same problems, or are unaware of each other,
industry's advances, or work ongoing in its own labs.
A commitment to remediation research and certification, both in
universities and in its labs, is not out of line with the Corps' culture. This
time, because the problems are so ill defined, the Corps must know what it
wants for its money and ensure that it creates a synergistic rather that
random effort among the separate minds they sponsor.
4.3.3 Improve Contracting
As discussed earlier in this study, some of the most formidable
obstacles to innovation by remediation contractors are the liability risks.
How can they be sure that the standard they clean to today will stand the
test of time? The current system allows little room for innovation because it
allows neither party (buyer or contractor) to accept the risks associated with
responsibly trying new technologies. The room for improvement in this area
for DOD seems limitless given their experience with contracting and the
construction industry. Already, some headway has been made. An
example from the Navy follows:
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A "Comprehensive Long Term Environmental Action, Navy"
(CLEAN) contract is an engineering service agreement for one year,
with nine option years, and has a maximum value of either $100 or
$130 million. All of the EFDs (Engineering Field Divisions) and the
EFA (Engineering Field Activity) have such contracts in force, or
award is imminent...Selected under Brooks Act procedures, the
CLEAN contracts are of the cost plus award fee type...Although these
contracts are intended primarily to provide engineering services from
initial studies through design, they have a provision that allows them
to be used for remedial action under certain circumstances...The
NAVFAC acquisition strategy is to have a portfolio of contracting
options so that the best fit can be made in consideration of a variety
of factors.
For construction and remediation, the NAVFAC concept is
similar. The Remedial Action Contract (RAC) is the newest type on
the scene...This contract is designed to satisfy the need for quick
access to remediation contractors and the latest technology,
irrespective of geographic EFD...Each contract is focused toward a
specific contaminant type, is a one-year agreement with four option
years, and is cost plus fixed fee...RACs are intended for modest size
cleanups--up to about $1 million each. RAC contractors may also be
requested to try innovative, cost-saving technologies to help learn
new cleanup techniques. 93
Contractors, owners, and designers enter different contracts for a
number of varied and important reasons--to outline responsibilities; to save
money; to gain input in the construction process, and; to speed-up the
construction process. However, the two most important reasons these
parties enter into contracts are dispute avoidance (keep out of court) and
the specified, if not fair, allocation of risk. Hazardous waste cleanups are a
new and unique problem. The waste presents latent risks new to the
construction industry and the cleanup of those wastes compounds and
confuses the risks for the traditional three parties. The courts muddle even
traditional construction processes and contracts--the specter of claims and
9 3 Captain James A. Rispoli, USN, "NAVFAC's Environmental Contracting Strategy," The
Military Engineer (Alexandria, Virginia: The Society of American Military Engineers, March-
April 1991), p. 45.
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liability in the environmental arena cast a dark cloud over the entire industry.
The new challenges and risks presented by this new and evolving problem
demand new contract types and methods. Traditional contracts like lump-
sum, or newer methods like design-build or cost-plus, may not be the best
or even an adequate template to both allocate these new risks or avoid
disputes. I recommend the Corps, with its long ties to construction,
sponsored research in contracting, and position of leadership in the federal
government, study and invent new contracts and contract-types for the
hazardous waste remediation of federal lands. As previously discussed,
lessons from DARPA and our weapons procurement history could prove
invaluable in providing a precedent and lessons learned in sponsoring
innovation or "buying risk." Innovation in contracting may need to precede
innovation in technology in this dynamic market.
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4.3.3.1 Dispute and Claim Avoidance
Somewhere in our agenda we must remove some barriers to
innovation, one of which is litigation. Innovation and advances in
technology benefit all of us. But innovation is accompanied by risk--a
risk we should understand, learn to deal with, and be willing to share.
Unfortunately, that hasn't happened. We in the U.S. have
become a litigious society. Whenever we don't like the results of
anything, we sue...
Behind war, litigation is the second most wasteful and
destructive activity of mankind--some think litigation is even worse
than war. The cost and strain of litigation is probably one of the most
significant demotivators in our society. Litigation is destructive,
demoralizing and it sucks the creative energy out of any enterprise.
Bluntly put, litigation and lawyers sap economic vitality. Lawyers are
a drain even if they work for free. 94
William D. Lewis
CEO, ASL Consulting Engineers
The above sentiment is not an exception, rather the norm in the
engineering and construction industry. Players in the world of construction
and design despise the court and the added costs in bonding, insurance,
and fees litigation brings. Owners, architect/engineers, and contractors
enter contracts to avoid litigation and its costs. Today, construction
contracts provide for mediation and arbitration in order to settle disputes
out-of-court. If society or the government expect the market to solve
remediation's technological problems, they need to lower the entry barriers
(liability risks) for potential innovators and market segment entrants
discussed earlier.
The Corps is no stranger to the courts. In fact, their contracting
expertise now deters top firms from doing business for the Corps because
of the small margins and claims process. However, as the federal
government's engineer and the principal government researcher in
9 4 William D. Lewis, "Perspective--Construction Technology," The Military Engineer
(Alexandria, Virginia: The Society of American Military Engineers, July 1991), p. 28.
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contracting, they have both the expertise and the opportunity to seize the
challenges presented by these new problems. After first understanding
exactly what the law requires of it and what power or leverage it has in the
execution of its cleanups (the stick), the Corps should innovate beyond the
current limits of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) in contracting its
cleanups. They should ensure that these innovative methods, tailored to
hazardous waste remediation, have as a primary objective dispute avoidance
yet maintain sufficient leverage that they are not patsy's for unacceptable or
sub-standard performance by the contractors. Contracting has long been
the subject of research and debate both inside and outside the Corps--the
problem just got tougher.
4.3.3.2 Underwrite "Risk"
When the Five Competitive Forces and their impact on the market do
not favor firms seeking first-mover advantages through technological
innovation, and when the cost of technological stagnation is so grave, the
Federal government should get involved. Unfortunately (or rather,
fortunately), Congress can't legislate innovation. The government must be
seek other ways to prime the pump. Again, I recommend DOD be the lead
agency in altering these five forces--at first in their market segment, then
later to export process and innovations to other federal segments.
Shifting the market forces requires an agency/buyer with significant
resources and credibility. The Corps is one of the few players who can
create this kind of impact in the market. The best way for DOD to create
incentives for innovators in the industry is to underwrite or buy some of the
technological, legal, and market risks endemic to the current market. Again,
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through innovative contracting, the Corps could sponsor or test new
technologies for cleaning-up. The probability that remedial breakthroughs
will be incremental, not monumental, suggest a long-term commitment by
the government to finding an answer. In this way, government and industry
can create a new expert team and should evolve into true experts--given
physicist Niels Bohr's definition of an expert as "a man who has made all
the mistakes which can be made in a very narrow field." 95
This paper does not pretend to be the only beacon of light for either
DOD or the market. Both are moving towards improving the current
contracting process in relation to both dispute avoidance and, to a minimal
extent, underwriting risks. One example is a recent series of executive level
"contracts forums" sponsored by the Society of American Military Engineers
Environmental Affairs Committee. Senior members of the Department of
Defense and remedial action contractors (RACs) attended. The most recent
forum focused on liability, indemnification, and bonding in environmental
contracting. Three key issues were discussed:
* There is a risk to the remedial action contractor (RAC) performing
environmental work. Part of this risk are the unknowns associated with the
work. Another part is the potential for third-party liability suits resulting
from the performance of such work.
* RACs are unable to obtain professional performance liability
insurance for hazardous waste site cleanup projects. The insurance industry
is reluctant to provide insurance because of the high risk of liability
associated with performing such work. Available insurance covers only the
period of work performance, not the time during which RACs are most
susceptible to third-party liability suits.
9 5 from Harry Otway,"Experts, Risk Communication, and Democracy," Risk Analysis (vol. 7,
no. 2, 1987), p.125.
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* RACs cannot obtain the surety bonds required for federal hazardous
waste cleanup projects because the surety bond industry sees a high liability
risk in issuing such bonds. Available bonds are generally for projects of less
than $5 million value. Some companies are self-bonding to meet
government requirements.
* RACs feel that the DOD is responsible for the presence of
hazardous material on the site and, therefore, should be responsible for their
portion of the risk associated with cleanup. RACs believe that DOD should
indemnify RACs performing work against third-party liability to cover the
government's part of the risk.
In response to the concerns raised by RACs, DOD representatives
indicated they would consider these potential solutions to resolve the issues
raised:
* Change the laws so that RACs are excluded as potentially
responsible party for liability suits resulting from cleanup.
* Revise the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) to extend the
applicability of indemnification to contractor work done as part of the
Defense Environmental Restoration Program.
* Limit the statute of limitations for contractors on environmental
cleanup projects and limit the contractor's liability for a project.
* Limit the contractor's liability to that resulting from their negligence.
* Negotiate the risks of a project with the contractor and determine
equitable distribution of the risk between the contractor and the government
as part of the contract.
These considerations and related issues will be addressed in a
Congressionally mandated DOD study of the liabilities faced by firms
providing environmental restoration services to DOD. 96
9 6 Glen Burg, "Environmental Digest--Environmental Contracting," The Military Engineer
(Alexandria, Virginia: The Society of American Military Engineers, July 1991), p. 22.
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4.3.4 Protect the Innovator--Proprietary guarantees
Knowledge, know-how, experience and technological expertise
are essential to an E&C firm's ability to secure jobs. Research
conducted by MIT shows that international E&C firms are not only
knowledge-intensive; their expertise and knowledge are the basis for
their competitiveness in the global market...(In the past) the
construction firm's comparative advantage has been mostly in its
human capital. The emergence of a pure service output as the main
function of many E&C firms has reinforced its importance...Today,
firms are defining themselves in terms of the knowledge that is
embodied in their organizations and human capital...In this emerging
picture of the E&C industry, the relative importance of knowledge
becomes greater and each firm's specialization becomes a major
factor in the client's selection process. 97
Fred Moavenzadeh
Editor in Chief, CBR
The one, golden rule espoused by Michael Porter in his two books,
Competitive Strategy and Competitive Advantage is that a firm's goal is
always to pursue strategies which enable it to sustain its competitive
advantage.
One more way the Corps can stimulate industry to seek innovative
solutions to our nation's remediation problems is to guarantee firms can gain
proprietary rights to the technologies they develop. While this
recommendation seems intuitive, our strategic analysis of the market, its
segmentation, and competitive forces which shape it demand its careful
consideration. Contracts and incentives which invite aggressive new
entrants to the market and stimulate innovation from existing rivals are only
half the story. Firms which strategically plan and vigorously execute and
pursue ways to create then sustain competitive advantage.
9 7 Fred Moavenzadeh, "Strategic Response to a Changing Engineering and Construction
Market," Construction Business Review (Vienna, Virginia: HLK Global Communications,
Inc., March-April 1991), pp. 27-28.
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The key for the Corps is to combine the innovative contracting
proposed above with a new policy that protects contracted firms if they
innovate while working for the Corps. Firms which gain first-mover
competitive advantages by technological advancement will want to erect
barriers to entry in their market segment and keep current rivals off-balance
as long as possible. What firm would be willing to shoulder the financial,
market, and liability risks of forwarding a new technology if the buyer (in
this case, the government) is willing to give away their secrets for the public
good? The answer is: not a very smart firm. DOD must look at the
situation from industry's point of view. A recent article in Construction
Business Review spelled out this perspective.
Protecting your intellectual property rights is good business in
today's market. Contractors have large investments from developing
inventions, trademarks and written works, but they have not had a
tradition of protecting the proprietary technology that they have
developed. Today, technology, expertise and procedures are
providing the competitive edge in the construction industry.
Construction contractors' intellectual property should be and can be
legally protected. 9 8
The challenge for the Corps is in creating a win-win solution in this
situation for DOD and the innovating firms. One way to do this is to grant
the innovator proprietary rights over the technologies they develop while
"underwritten" by the Corps. In return, the Corps should ensure
contractually that they have first priority on the new proprietary technology
for DOD cleanups. They can then release the firm to shop, sell, or use their
excess capabilities in other market segments. This ensures the Corps can
9 8 Richard Edmister and Calfee H. Griswald, "Exclusivity in the Marketplace--How to Protect
Proprietary Technology," Construction Business Review (Vienna, Virginia: HLK Global
Communications, Inc., January-February 1991), p.45.
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complete its mission, the firm can sustain its competitive advantage, and
other markets and messes can benefit from the innovation.
4.5 Conclusion
Pursue both strategies for innovation. I believe the Department of
Defense is in the enviable position of pursuing both strategies discussed in
Section 3.4. Both the weapons procurement model (high-tech) and the
highways model (low-tech) can benefit DOD, the construction and
hazardous waste industries, and society as a whole in cleaning-up the mess.
Both are unifying, mutual-gains, package methods of implementing the
myriad of recommendations proposed by this study.
While the high-tech model requires the most change (especially
cultural) within the Department of Defense, it represents the best chance for
finding truly break-through technologies. Restructuring of our contracting
relationships and a new role for our federal laboratories represent a new
direction for the Corps.
A mandate for setting definable, clear specifications (demanded by
the second model) creates less structural/cultural change within the DOD.
The collaborative effort between the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Corps, and the long list of interested stakeholders is daunting, yet
achievable. It is here where pervasive arguments for "safe" versus
"pristine" should be pushed by DOD--again a daunting mission. The value
of incremental advances in process and product can not be overstated and
mandate pursuing the second model.
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